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I. INTRODUCTION
In public sector bargaining it is often hard to distinguish between an
employer's contended inability to fund a collective bargaining agreement
with its unwillingness to pay.' Undoubtedly governments do experience
periods of fiscal concern, but claiming "inability to pay" as frequently as
they do renders those claims about as effective as "crying wolf."'2 The notion
of underfunding a bargained-for labor agreement in the public sector is not
simply a problem of economics; rather, such a decision is driven largely by
political pressures inherent to the public domain.' It is that political feature
that distinguishes collective bargaining in the public sector from that in the
private
The political habits of Florida's public sector are no less intrusive. The
state's collective bargaining scheme is riddled with concessions, exceptions,
limitations, and conditions, all in the name of striking a balance among com-
peting legal powers and political decision-making. For instance, the process
requires reconciliation of labor bargaining laws with non-labor laws, 6 with
the legislature's law-making and appropriation powers,7 and with public em-
1. See RICHARD C. KEARNEY WITH DAVID G. CARNEVALE, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 153 (3d ed. 2001).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 122-24.
4. See id. at 113.
5. See Stephen F. Befort, Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral
Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1234 (1984-1985).
6. See id. at 1252.
7. Id. at 1243, 1245.
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ployers' struggle :j maintain flexibility in cases of bona fide fiscal crises.8
The latter example is especially relevant today as Florida governments strug-
gle to maintain integrity in their enterprises amidst the state's historically
weak economy.9
Within the state's statutory regulations for bargaining in the public sec-
tor, public employers will find the Financial Urgency Statute in section
447.4095 of the Florida Statutes quite appealing." Passed in 1995, the law
seemingly allows a public employer to avoid its collective bargaining re-
sponsibility and abridge the collective bargaining contract in cases of "finan-
cial urgency."" But despite the legislature's good intentions when crafting
the statute, its language poses more questions than answers.' 2 Even now,
fifteen years after its enactment, the statute remains a mystery. 13 Outside of a
single decision granted by Florida's Public Employees Relations Commis-
sion (PERC) 14 in 2009,'5 there is not much guidance for those seeking to in-
8. See id. at 1250.
9. See Michael C. Bender & Dara Kam, Citing Brighter Florida Economy, Crist Seeks 4
Percent Budget Hike, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 30, 2010, at Al.
10. FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010).
11. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, §§ 2-3, 1995 Fla. Laws. 1943, 1943-44 (codi-
fied as amended at FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (1995)).
12. See id. For instance, what does "financial urgency" mean? Why does the language
call for "impact" bargaining instead of "collective" bargaining? When can this statute be
used-during the life of an existing contract, during the status quo, or both? And finally, how,
or even can, this statute be interpreted to make it compatible with the Florida Constitution?
13. Two Florida school districts in 2002 challenged the constitutionality of section
447.4095. Jack E. Ruby, Fiscal Problems and Unilateral Change, PERC NEWS (Fla. Pub.
Emps. Relations Comm'n, Tallahassee, Fla.), Apr. 1-Jun. 30, 2007, at 10. Both cases, how-
ever, settled out of court, precluding any judicial analysis. Id. The first time the statute came
before PERC for interpretation was in 2009 in Manatee Education Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 46, at
86 (2009). In terms of state court, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit had the opportunity to review
the constitutionality of the statute in 2010, in which it found for the defendant. See Final
Judgment Declaring Section 447.4095 Florida Statutes to be Constitutional and Denying
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1 Miami Ass'n of Firefighters Local 587 v. City of Mi-
ami, No. 10-27577-CA20, (Fa. 1lth Cir. Ct. May 26, 2010) [hereinafter Final Judgment].
14. PERC is the commission created by the Florida Legislature to oversee and regulate
the provisions of part II, chapter 447. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.205, .207 (2010). The commission
falls under the direction of the Department of Management Services, see id. § 447.205(3)-(4),
and is "composed of a chair and two full-time members." Id. § 447.205(1). It conducts hear-
ings and resolves disputes concerning alleged unfair labor practices and the composition of
bargaining units. id. § 447.207(6). PERC decisions are subject to judicial review. Id. §
447.504. For more information about PERC, visit its website at http://perc.myflorida.com.
15. See Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 46, at 87.
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voke the statute. Nonetheless, public employers are declaring "financial
urgency" more frequently now than ever before.6
The City of Miami's fiscal condition in late 2010, as it was displayed by
the media, painted a good portrait of the conflict between public spending
and collective bargaining. 7 Purportedly facing a $100 million budget deficit
in 2011, the city contemplated layoffs for more than 1000 of its employees.
18
A large part of its financial woes, claimed the city, was attributed to growing
pension costs promised to city firefighters through its existing labor agree-
ment with the group's powerful union. 9 The bargaining agreement carried
with it a $101 million price tag for the 2011 fiscal year.2' The city's despera-
tion to avoid that price led it to invoke a "financial urgency" under Florida
Statutes section 447.4095.21
There was, however, a large chunk of information missing from the
media's story. The city's obligation to pay the pension costs was imposed by
a mutually agreed to collective bargaining agreement.22 At some point prior
to the dispute, Miami officials bargained over the terms contained therein, a
process that envisions a give and take relationship, where concessions are
made in exchange for giving by the other side.23 That suggests the firefighter
union forfeited something in return for its sought-after pension.24 Allowing
the city to unilaterally change the terms of that bargained-for-benefit based
on an unverified assertion of inability to pay-and without returning to the
collective bargaining process to remedy the problem--essentially renders the
bargaining process null.'
PERC, in 2009, issued the first and most recent interpretation of the Fi-
nancial Urgency Statute whose surprising decision lends support to the city's
actions. 26 But adhering to PERC's decision would cause the city to abridge
17. See Ruby, supra note 13, at 10 (recognizing that 2002 was the first year in which any
public entity and employee union commenced litigation over the statute); see, e.g., Julie
Brown, City Weighs Layoffs, Event Cuts, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17, 2010, at 3B ("Following in
the steps of the city of Miami, [the] Hollywood City Commission earlier this month declared a
'financial urgency,' a legal maneuver that allows city officials to unilaterally reopen labor
contracts when in a dire financial crisis.").
17. See Charles Rabin, Miami Commission Focuses on Averting Budget Calamity, MIAMI
HERALD, June 11, 2010, at B1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010).
22. See Rabin, supra note 17.
23. See Befort, supra note 5, at 1266.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 46, at 86 (2009).
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two fundamental rights that its employees enjoy under the Florida Constitu-
tion. Article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution grants public employees
the right to collectively bargain over terms and conditions of employment.27
And article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution that protects public em-
ployees' vested right to collectively bargain. 28 The Supreme Court of Florida
has held that in a situation in which the government seeks to violate those
rights, it must first prove a compelling state interest and show no viable al-
ternatives to its proposed action.29 When the imposition of a fundamental
right is involved, Florida's highest court does not approve the application of
any less-stringent standard, particularly in this context.
30
The Financial Urgency Statute is not the first of its kind in Florida.
Section 447.309(2) of the Florida Statutes, commonly referred to as the Un-
derfunding Statute, serves a similar purpose.3 The Supreme Court of Florida
interpreted and applied the Underfunding Statute in two significant cases just
a few years prior to that statute's major amendment; the amendment to sec-
tion 447.309(2) was part of the same bill in which the legislature adopted
section 447.4095.32 The Court, in State v. Florida Police Benevolent Associ-
ation (Florida PBA) 33 and Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida,34 set the stan-
dards for when and how a public employer can abridge its employees' fun-
damental rights by making unilateral changes to the collective bargaining
agreement in times of a financial crisis.35 Accordingly, there is no need, and
no justification, for Florida courts to start from scratch in deciding how to
interpret and apply the new Financial Urgency Statute since Florida PBA and
Chiles have established the relevant precedent. 36 Any interpretation or appli-
27. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, section 6 is known as the "Right to work" provi-
sion. Id. It reads:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-
membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through
a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees
shall not have the right to strike.
Id.
28. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10. Article I, section 10, the contracts clause, reads: "No bill of
attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." Id.
29. Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993).
30. See, e.g., Hillsborough Cnty. Govtl. Emps. Ass'n v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation
Auth., 522 So. 2d 358, 362 (Fla. 1988).
31. See FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2) (2010).
32. See Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 673; State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla. PBA), 613
So. 2d 415,419 (Fla. 1992).
33. 613 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992).
34. 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
35. See Chiles, 615 So. 2dat673;Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2dat421.
36. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 673; Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 421.
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cation of the Financial Urgency Statute incongruent with those cases would
render it unconstitutional, and therefore void.
This paper offers insight into how Florida has dealt with the conflict be-
tween control of the public purse and collective bargaining, and how it
should proceed in the future to ease those conflicts under the Financial Ur-
gency Statute. Part I will provide an overview of the history of collective
bargaining in Florida's public sector and lead into a framework of how the
collective bargaining process works today. That discussion will make the
important distinction between impact and collective bargaining, and how
each relates to the statutory impasse procedure. The next section will review
the regulations that guide the relationship between a public employer's fiscal
control and its permissive unilateral change to the terms of a labor contract.
Part V will dicuss the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission
(PERC) as well as court decisions on the Underfunding Statute and how
those interpretations provide examples of how the Financial Urgency Statute
should be applied today. Part VI will attempt to unravel the Financial Ur-
gency Statute by interpreting its legislative history and its existing case law,
and will be followed by a discussion of its constitutional implications. Ulti-
mately, that part will demonstrate how the statute can-and should be-
interpreted in order to to make it compatible with the Florida Constitution,
the rights of public employers, and the rights of public employees.
Finally, the paper will conclude with an outlook of the Financial Urgen-
cy Statute with an interpretation that makes it compliant with the state Con-
stitution and common law. In that form, it has the potential to provide each
side of the bargaining table with the protection it deserves: a solution for a
public employer that needs to avoid its contractual labor obligations to pre-
serve its financial integrity, while congruently preserving the bargaining
process and fundamental rights of public employees under Florida's Consti-
tution.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BARGAINING RIGHTS FOR FLORIDA'S PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES3 7
Congress paved the way for union activity in the private sector with the
passing of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).38 Eight years
37. For a comprehensive review of the progression of collective bargaining rights for
Florida's public employees, see Raymond G. McGuire, Public Employee Collective Bargain-
ing in Florida-Past, Present and Future, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 26 (1973).
38. Curtis L. Mack & Ezra D. Singer, Florida Public Employees: Is the Solution to the
Free Rider Problem Worse than the Problem Itself?, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1347, 1347 (1978).
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later, the Florida Legislature crafted its own law, Chapter 447 of the Florida
Statutes, to recognize the rights of employees within the state to self-
organize and collectively bargain with their employers.39 But the term "em-
ployee" as used in chapter 447 was ambiguous. 0 Unlike the language in the
NLRA, which specifically excluded public employees from its application,41
the Florida legislation was silent as to whether the term "employee" included
public workers.42
Also in 1943, the year it adopted chapter 447, Florida amended section
12 of the Declaration of Rights of its 1885 Constitution to include a "right to
work" provision, thereby designating itself a "right to work" state.43 Under
that provision, the state prohibited employers from requiring their employees
to join unions as conditions of employment. 44 It gave public employees the
right to make independent decisions about their participation in organized
labor.45 But again, the legislature left section 12 ambiguous in regard to its
application to public employees. 46 The ambiguity in section 12 and chapter
447 left no choice for public employees but to return to the common law
rule, which imposed no obligation on their employers to collectively bargain
with them.
47
Then in 1946, in Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. City of Miami,4 8
the Supreme Court of Florida resolved the ambiguities by ruling that chapter
Congress passed the NLRA to protect the rights of employees to organize and bargain collec-
tively, to encourage the collective bargaining process and to protect employers from work
disruptions caused by bargaining issues. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
39. See FLA. STAT. §§ 447.01-.15 (2010). Chapter 447 is currently split in two parts-
the first relates to private employees, Id. §§ 447.01-.17, and the second to public employees.
Id. §§ 447.201-.609. The second part was not adopted until 1973. Public Employee Rela-
tions Act (PERA), ch. 74-100, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 134, 134-54 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. §§ 447.201-.609 (1975)).
40. See FLA. STAT. § 447.02 (2010) (missing a definition of "employee").
41. 29 U.S.C. § 152. "The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an
employer... but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corpo-
ration.., or any State or political subdivision thereof..." Id.
42. See FLA. STAT. § 447.02 (missing a definition of "employee").
43. H.R.J. Res. 13, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1943) (enacted).
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-
membership in any labor union, or labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not be
construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organization or la-
bor union to bargain collectively with their employer,
Id.
44. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625 of Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 141 So. 2d 269, 272-73
(Fla. 1962), aff'd 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
45. Id.
46. See Fla. H.R.J. Res. 13.
47. McGuire, supra note 37, at 34,
48. 26 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1946) (en banc).
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447 and section 12 applied to only the private sector.49 It based part of its
reasoning on the fact that chapter 447 afforded those covered under its provi-
sions a right to strike, the act of which was adverse to the theory of govern-
ment. 50 Logically then, the Court concluded that the legislature must not
have intended for the statute to apply to public labor affairs. 51
The aftermath of the Miami Water Works Local No. 654 decision,
paired with the common law regulation of collective bargaining, stripped
public employees' access to any meaningful union activity in Florida.52 But
with the onset of the sixties, their pent-up frustration emerged aimed at state
lawmakers.53
Between 1960 and 1969, the state experienced twenty-five public em-
ployee strikes that caused public agencies significant losses in manpower and
services. 54 Their hostility peaked in 1968 when 35,000 public school teach-
ers gathered to protest their lack of bargaining rights-the first protest of its
kind in the nation.55 The statewide teachers' strike caught the interest of
state lawmakers, who were otherwise distracted by the 1968 revision of the
Florida Constitution.56  Their inattentiveness contributed to the death of
every bill submitted in response to the teachers' protest. 57 But their efforts
were not entirely in vain.58 Floridians approved the new constitution that
year, which did away with section 12 and replaced it with a new "right to
work" provision found in article 1, section 6.59 The language in the new sec-
tion was almost identical to that in section 12,6 but nonetheless would be
49. Id. at 197.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. McGuire, supra note 37, at 34, 38.
53. Id. at 29-30.
54. David M. Orta, Public Employee Collective Bargaining in Florida: Collective Bar-
gaining or Collective Begging?, 23 STETSON L. REv. 269, 276 (1993) (citing McGuire, supra
note 37, at 28).
55. McGuire, supra note 37, at 28-29.
56. Id. at 30.
57. See id. at 30-31.
58. See John-Edward Alley & Joseph W. Carvin, Collective Bargaining for Public Em-
ployees in Florida-in Need of a Popular Vote?, 56 FLA. B.J. 715, 717 (1982). The 1968
Constitutional Revision Commission made two recommendations affecting collective bargain-
ing: 1) to specify that public employees do not have the right to strike, and 2) to include "in
the collective bargaining provision an extension of collective bargaining rights to 'employees,
public and private."' Id.
59. McGuire, supra note 37, at 40.
60. Id. For the language of Florida's post-1968 "Right to work" provision, see supra text
accompanying note 27.
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interpreted to provide public sector employees the rights for which they had
been fighting.6'
A. The Turning Point: Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Dade County Classroom
Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan,62 interpreted the new "right to work" provision as it
related to public employees' right to collectively bargain with their employ-
ers.63 With an opinion written by Chief Justice Ervin, a unanimous Court
held that "with the exception of the right to strike, public employees have the
same rights of collective bargaining as are granted [to] private employees by
[slection 6."64 The Court then sent a clear message to the legislature pushing
it to enact regulations that would allow its decision to have effect. 65 To that
regard, Chief Justice Ervin noted:
A delicate balance must be struck in order that there be no denial
of the guaranteed right of public employees to bargain collectively
with public employers without, however, in any way trenching
upon the prohibition against public employees striking either di-
rectly or indirectly or using coercive or intimidating tactics in the
collective bargaining process. 6
6
Following the landmark decision in Ryan, Florida became the first state
to provide public employees a constitutional right to collectively bargain.
67
The case also signified the beginning of a judicial pledge to protect the those
rights for public employees in Florida.
68
The opinion in Ryan was significant, but like the provision in article I,
section 6, not self-executing. 69 As Chief Justice Ervin so urged, the legisla-
ture needed to adopt guidelines before public employees could fully enjoy
61. McGuire, supra note 37, at 40 nn.55-58.
62. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
63. Id. at 905.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 906.
66. Id.
67. David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: A Ten-Year Retrospective on the
State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REv. 693, 723 (1990); see also William F. McHugh, The
Florida Experience in Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 1974-1978: Bellwether for
the South, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 263, 264-65 (1978) (finding the Florida experience unique
since its grant of bargaining rights to public employees was adopted by state residents through
a Constitutional revision).
68. Orta, supra note 54, at 277.
69. See Ryan, 225 So. 2d at 906.
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their new constitutional right.70 After two years of waiting for the Court's
mandate to be obeyed, public employees again grew frustrated by the ignor-
ance of lawmakers at all levels of government.7'
Then, three years post the Ryan decision, a Dade County teacher's un-
ion filed suit against the Florida Legislature in an effort to compel it to adopt
the necessary guidelines.72 In Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v.
Legislature,73 the Supreme Court of Florida reiterated its decision that public
employees enjoy the same right to collectively bargain as do private em-
ployees under the Florida Constitution.74 Nonetheless, on balance, the Court
decided that it was premature to certify judicial enactment of the rights. 5
But it noted that if the legislature did not act within a reasonable amount of
time, then the Court would be forced to create the guidelines by judicial de-
cree.
76
Heeding the Court's warning, the 1973 Florida Legislature passed the
comprehensive Public Employees Relations Act (PERA),77 making Florida
the first southern state to grant all its public workers the right to collectively
bargain with their employers.78 PERA essentially provided public employees
with the right to join and participate in labor unions, required public employ-
ers to negotiate with their employees' bargaining agents, and authorized the
70. Id.
71. See McGuire, supra note 37, at 49 (In 1971, a local of the International Association
of Firefighters in Broward County sought from the court a writ of mandamus to compel its
employer to collectively bargain, per the Ryan decision. The Fraternal Order of Police took
the same action against its employer in Orlando). "[L]ocal governments refused to bargain
absent statutory guidelines." McHugh, supra note 67, at 267.
75. Dade Cnty. Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla.
1972).
73. 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972).
74. Id. at 685.
75. Id. at 688.
76. Id.
77. Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), ch. 74-100, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (codi-
fied as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.201-.609 (1975)). For a comprehensive review of
PERA, see generally McHugh, supra note 67. The statement of policy for PERA as it reads
today is:
The public policy of this state, and the purpose of this part, is to provide statutory implementa-
tion of [article I, section 6] of the State Constitution, with respect to public employees; to pro-
mote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its employees, both
collectively and individually; and to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and
uninterrupted operations and functions of government. Nothing herein shall be construed ei-
ther to encourage or discourage organization of public employees.
FLA. STAT. § 447.201 (2010).
78. McHugh, supra note 67, at 264.
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creation of PERC to oversee public labor relations in the state.79 The legisla-
ture constructed the provisions of PERA to resemble the rights afforded to
private employees under the NLRA. 80 But, unlike its private sector counter-
part, PERA prohibited public employees from striking."
III. FLORIDA'S FRAMEWORK OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
UNDER PERA
The provisions contained in part II, chapter 447 of the Florida Statutes
implement the article I, section 6 guarantee of collective bargaining for pub-
lic employees.82 Collective bargaining means a process of mutual obliga-
tions in which a public employer 83 and a bargaining agent have to meet at
reasonable times, "negotiate in good faith",' and effect a written contract
encompassing agreements reached concerning the "wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment"--otherwise known as mandatory subjects
of bargaining.8 6 Neither party is compelled to agree to an offer or yield to a
79. FLA. STAT. § 447.201(1)-(3). PERC is "the ultimate authority to administratively
interpret chapter 447 and article I, section 6, of the Florida Constitution." Pub. Emps. Rela-
tions Comm'n v. Dade Cnty. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Dade Cnty. PBA), 467 So. 2d 987, 989
(Fla. 1985).
80. McHugh, supra note 67, at 270.
81. FLA. STAT. § 447.201(4).
82. Id. § 447.201.
83. The term "public employer"-like "legislative body"--is a term of art used by
PERC. See id. § 447.203(2) (stating that "'[p]ublic employer' . . . means the state or any
county, municipality, or special district or any subdivision or agency thereof which the com-
mission determines has sufficient legal distinctiveness properly to carry out the functions of a
public employer").
84. Id. § 447.203(14). The Florida Legislature defines good faith bargaining as:
[T]he willingness of both parties to meet at reasonable times and places, as mutually agreed
upon, in order to discuss issues which are proper subjects of bargaining, with the intent of
reaching a common accord. It shall include an obligation for both parties to participate active-
ly in the negotiations with an open mind and a sincere desire, as well as making a sincere ef-
fort, to resolve differences and come to an agreement.
Id. § 447.203(17).
85. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.309(1), .203(14); see also Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty. v. Palowitch,
367 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the bargaining table is the
legislatively mandated forum to determine wages, hours, and terms and conditions of em-
ployment).
86. Chapter 447 does not provide a list of subjects to be treated as mandatory in terms of
bargaining. See FLA. STAT. § 447.309(1) (requiring only that the certified employee union and
the public employer "bargain collectively in the determination of the wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment of the public employees within the bargaining unit"). As such,
PERC is tasked to make that decision on a case-by-case basis. PUB. EMPs. RELATIONS
COMM'N, SCOPE OF BARGAINING 2 (2d ed. 2005), available at
http://perc.myflorida.comlpubs/Scope-of-Bargaining.pdf [hereinafter PERC SCOPE OF
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concession, unless otherwise provided by PERC. s7 Florida law also requires
that the negotiation process be effective and meaningful for public em-
ployees. That means the negotiations process cannot lead to a result that
renders that right empty or hollow, and agreed upon contract provisions
should not be subject to unilateral change at the whim of the public employ-
er.89 In support of that reasoning, PERC established through its case law that
public employers may not unilaterally change a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining until the parties bargain to impasse or in two other limited circums-
tances: 1) where the bargaining agent is found to have unmistakably waived
its right to bargain,9" or 2) when the employer has a valid defense of "exigent
circumstances,"9' which will be discussed at greater length in section IV be-
low. Otherwise, unilateral change of a collective bargaining contract by a
public employer results in a per se unfair labor practice charge for the em-
ployer.92 In addition to the three exceptions established by PERC, there are
two statutory exceptions to when a public employer may act unilaterally to
change a mandatory subject of bargaining encompassed in a collective bar-
gaining agreement-the Underfunding Statute, which applies to only state-
level government, 93 and the Financial Urgency Statute.94 The particulars of
BARGAINING]. However, PERC allows a broad scope of topics to be included as "mandatory"
in an attempt to balance the power between employers and unions. Palm Beach Junior Coll.
Bd. of Trustees v. United Faculty of Palm Beach Junior Coll., 425 So. 2d 133, 139, 140 (Fla.
1 st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) approved in part by Palm Beach Junior Coll. Bd. of Trustees v. united
Faculty of Palm Beach Junior Coll., 475 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1985) (stating that "[t]he courts of
Florida in numerous instances have noted that [s]ection 447.309(1), Florida Statutes, requires
a relatively broad scope of negotiations to help counter-balance the absence of the right to
strike by public employees," and further stating that "PERC has concluded, rightly we believe,
that the stability to be encouraged in the bargaining relationship between public employer and
employee requires the parties to conduct negotiations over a broad range of subjects"). See
supra PERC SCOPE OF BARGAINING for a comprehensive look at PERC's decisions regarding
which subjects are and are not mandatory.
87. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(14).
88. Hillsborough Cnty. Govtl. Emps. Ass'n v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 522
So. 2d 358, 363 (Fla. 1988).
89. Id. (finding that the right of employees to collectively bargain "is not an empty or
hollow right subject to unilateral denial," but "is one [that] may not be abridged except upon
the showing of a compelling state interest").
90. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Lauderdale Lodge 31, 14 F.P.E.R. 19150, at 394
(1988) ("To meet this burden of proof an employer must make a clear and unmistakable show-
ing that the certified employee organization consciously yielded its right to negotiate with
respect to the particular subject of bargaining in question.").
91. Fla. Sch. for the Deaf & the Blind v. Fla. Sch. for the Deaf & the Blind Teachers
United (Fla. Sch. for the Deaf & the Blind Teachers United I1), 483 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
92. Id.
93. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2)(b) (2010).
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those two statutes are at issue in this paper and will be discussed below at
great length.
A. The Bargaining Process
Sometimes, there is a very thin line between a mandatory subject and a
permissive subject of bargaining.9" Normally, a public employer is permitted
to make a unilateral change to conduct or action that escapes the statutory
definition of a mandatory subject, or if the subject of that action falls within a
right of management." In those two instances, the subject is considered a
permissive subject of bargaining.91
The legislature defined "management rights" in section 447.209 of the
Florida Statutes. 98 But, generally, management rights are those rights that
allow employers to exercise control over decisions that have significant im-
pacts on the functioning of their enterprises. 99 But, there is an important ca-
veat to that rule that makes management rights more of a hybrid between
permissive and mandatory subjects: if the modification of a subject classi-
fied as a management right would have an effect on the employees' terms
and conditions of employment, then the public employer is required to give
those employees' bargaining agent an opportunity to bargain the impact of
that modification, which is known as impact bargaining.'00
Impact bargaining, unlike collective bargaining, restricts negotiations
only to the effect of the change and not the change itself. 01 Also, unlike
collective bargaining, the employer that impact bargains does not need to
94. Id. § 447.4095.
95. See Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20 v. City of Miami, 609 So. 2d 31, 33-
34 (Fla. 1992).
96. Id. at 33.
97. Id.
98. See FLA. STAT. § 447.209. The Florida Legislature defines public employers' rights
as:
[T]he right of the public employer to determine unilaterally the purpose of each of its constitu-
ent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and dis-
cretion over its organization and operations. It is also the right of the public employer to direct
its employees, take disciplinary action for proper cause, and relieve its employees from duty
because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons.
Id.
99. See Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20, 609 So. 2d at 34.
100. City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Supervisor's Ass'n, 791 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that section 447.209 does not require a public employer to nego-
tiate good faith changes in its organization and operations "unless those [changes] impact the
determination of wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of employees within
the bargaining unit").
101. See id.at5ll.
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complete negotiations before it implements its changes. 10 2 The employer
must, however, provide adequate notice to the bargaining unit of its intention
to implement the change, and if the bargaining unit requests to bargain the
impact of the management rights, the employer must do so for a reasonable
period of time before implementing its decision. 1
03
Public sector collective bargaining agreements that are accepted and ra-
tified by the parties become legally enforceable contracts. 1°4 Based on the
law of contracts, the parties must abide by the provisions of a collective bar-
gaining agreement during its life. 0 5 But unlike contract law, in which par-
ties' obligations expire along with the contract, the terms of a collective bar-
gaining contract survive its death.' 6 The time following expiration of the
contract is known as the "status quo" period.10 7 The status quo encompasses
the terms and conditions of employment that employees covered under the
previous contract have reasonable expectations to continue, and it mandates
that the employer actually continues implementation of those terms until a
new agreement is reached. 10 8 The "reasonable expectation" can stem from
an established past practice or from an explicit provision in the collective
bargaining contract. 109
1. Resolving Bargaining Conflict Through Impasse
Whether engaged in collective or impact bargaining, parties are never
forced to reach an agreement." 0 In situations where the parties cannot agree
to a term, each has the option to declare an impasse."' The impasse proce-
dure specifies an intricate procedure an employer must follow before unilate-
102. Id. at510.
103. Id. (noting that an employer can satisfy its obligation to impact bargain by providing
to the bargaining agent "notice and a reasonable opportunity to bargain").
104. R. Theodore Clark, Jr., Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements: Contents
and Enforcement, in THE EVOLVING PROCESS-COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT 407, 413 (Robert D. Helsby et al. eds., 1985).
105. See Palowitch, 2 F.P.E.R. 280, at 282 (1977) (holding that a public employer's
unilateral change to any mandatory subject of bargaining is a "per se violation of the duty to
bargain collectively and constitutes an unfair labor practice").
106. Steven J. Scott, The Status Quo Doctrine: An Application to Salary Step Increases
for Teachers, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 194, 195 (1997).
107. City of Delray Beach v. Prof I Firefighters of Delray Beach, Local 1842, 636 So. 2d
157, 159 n.3 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
108. Id. at 162-63.
109. Id. at 159 n.3, 162.
110. See FLA. STAT. § 447.403(l) (2010).
111. Id.
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rally implementing its own terms.1 2 The procedure allows for optional med-
iation between the parties before they proceed to a special magistrate hear-
ing.'13 The special magistrate will recommend a non-binding resolution.
1 4
If the special magistrate's proposal for settlement of the contract is rejected
by either party, the matter is referred to the designated legislative body for
final disposition.'
1
"
5
IV. UNILATERAL CHANGE AND FISCAL CONTROL
Espousing a general principle of bargaining in the private arena, Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, once
stated, "Having had the music, he must pay the piper. ' 16 He directed his
words at a private employer who sought to reap the benefits of a bargained-
for labor contract without paying its cost. 117 Therein lies one of the major
differences between collective bargaining in the two sectors. 18 For private
actors, collective bargaining is all about the economics, while those in the
public sphere act according to not only economics, but to politics, as well." 9
Public employees bargain over public money, the control of which is a
legislative function. 120 Bargaining in the public sector is largely intertwined
with politics; public employees are not the only ones fighting for a piece of
the budget--citizens, interest groups, and politicians each have a perspective
112. Orta, supra note 54, at 279. The impasse process acts as a substitute for public em-
ployees' right to strike. Id.
113. Id. at 279-80; FLA. STAT. § 447.403(l)-(2)(a).
114. FLA. STAT. § 447.403(3).
115. Id. § 447.403(4); see also id. § 447.203(10) (defining "legislative body" in the con-
text of the impasse procedure). The legislative body should determine a resolution based on
the best interests of the public and the employees. Id. § 447.403(4)(d). Once its decision is
issued, the provisions of the contract are reduced to writing, signed by the parties, and submit-
ted to the union for ratification. Id. § 447.403(4)(e). If the union ratifies the contract, it be-
comes binding for the mutually agreed-to term. FLA. STAT. § 447.403(4)(e). If it is not rati-
fied, the contract takes effect on the date of the legislative action and is binding only through
"the remainder of the first fiscal year which was the subject of negotiations." Id.
116. Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 271 (1983).
117. Id. at270-71.
118. See KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 1, at 113.
119. Id.
120. State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla. PBA), 613 So. 2d 415, 418-19 (Fla. 1992)
(noting that public and private sector collective bargaining will never be the same when it
comes to funding negotiated agreements); see also David H. Allshouse, The Role of the Ap-
propriations Process in Public Sector Bargaining, 17 URB. LAW. 165, 165 (1985) ("[T]he
appropriations process [at all levels of government] has become a major factor in public sector
employee relations.").
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on how the money should be spent.' 21 The political context in which those
funding decisions are made place great limitations on the abilities of employ-
ers and bargaining agents to cut deals. 122 This is especially true when money
is tight-making decisions on what to fund gets harder and pressure from
outside groups stronger.1
23
In the spirit of relieving that pressure on governments, the trend in Flor-
ida law is to allow public agencies leeway to deal with financial emergencies
by expanding the instances in which they may take unilateral action to modi-
fy a term of the contract. 124  Besides the three aforementioned instances
when, pursuant the PERC, a public employer may unilaterally change a
mandatory subject of bargaining, public agencies too have options to act
under statutory provisions. 1
25
A. Unilateral Action Allowed by PERC
As pronounced by the legislature in part I, chapter 447 of the Florida
Statutes, the provisions therein are implemented to ensure employees the
rights they are promised under article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitu-
tion. 126 To that end, the legislature granted PERC the power to "adopt,
promulgate, amend, or rescind such rules and regulations as it deems neces-
sary ... to carry out the provisions of [chapter 447]. ' '127 Under that authori-
ty, PERC forbids unilateral action by an employer concerning a mandatory
subject of bargaining absent an explicit waiver or in situations in which it can
prove exigent circumstances, or after the parties bargain to impasse and the
employer enacts the legislative body's recommendation. 28 The only excep-
121. See KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 1, at 113.
122. Jean J. Couturier, Public Sector Bargaining Civil Service, Politics, and the Rule of
Law, in THE EVOLVING PROCESS--COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 55,
59-60 (Robert D. Helsby et al. eds., 1985).
123. See id. at 60.
124. Compare Dade Cnty. Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla.
1969) (holding that "with the exception of the right to strike, public employees have the same
rights [as private employees in terms] of collective bargaining"), with Chiles v. United Faculty
of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993) (recognizing "the legislature must be given some
leeway to deal with bona fide [financial] emergencies") and Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d. at 418
(holding public and private employees' rights to collectively bargain are inherently different
since a negotiated agreement is always subject to funding by the legislature).
125. See FLA. STAT. § 447.403(1) (2010).
126. Id. § 447.201.
127. Id. § 447.207(1).
128. City of Winter Springs v. Winter Springs Prof'l, 885 So. 2d 494, 498 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2004).
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tion addressed in this paper is exigent circumstances, because it is the excep-
tion pled by employers facing financial distress.'29
The exigent circumstances exception is an affirmative defense to unila-
teral change available to public employers. 3 Its purpose is to "provide relief
to an employer who is forced by an emergency to quickly and immediately
modify the wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment of its em-
ployees."'' Ultimately, it allows the employer to modify the terms or condi-
tions of a mandatory subject of bargaining without first negotiating the
change.32  Unilateral action based on this exception is proper only in re-
sponse to an urgent need, 33 and only when the employer can prove there is
no viable alternative to its action. 134 The defense of waiver will not be dis-
cussed in this paper, because it is not an applicable defense to a public em-
ployer's financial distress. 35
In the context of financial emergencies, an employer can claim exigent
circumstances in defense to a complaint by a union for the employer's unila-
teral change to a mandatory subject of bargaining. 36 But PERC has been
reluctant over the years to allow employers to use the defense based on asser-
tions that they cannot afford to abide by their contract terms. 137 For instance,
PERC has recognized that a shortfall of funds in one budget is not a per se
emergency because of the availability of funds in other budgets that can be
129. See Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n (Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n 1), 18
F.P.E.R. 23069, at 122 (1992), rev'd, 614 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
130. See id.
131. Id. (quoting Fla. Sch. for the Deaf & the Blind Teachers United (Fla. Sch. for the
Deaf & the Blind Teachers United 1), 11 F.P.E.R. 16080, at 263 (1985), aff'd, 483 So. 2d 58
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
132. See id.
133. See Fla. Sch. for the Deaf & the Blind Teachers United I, 11 F.P.E.R. 16080, at
263-64.
134. See Volusia Cnty. Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 3574, 32 F.P.E.R. 89, at 218 (2006)
(finding that an inability to reach an agreement is not an exigent circumstance because, the
employer has an alternative solution in impasse procedures); Fla. Classified Emp's. Ass'n, 7
F.P.E.R. 12100, at 236 (1981) (declaring the exigent circumstances defense requires a show-
ing of no viable alternative to taking immediate action).
135. Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23069, at 122 (finding that the
appropriate defense is exigent circumstances for public employer financial distress).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 123; Tarpon Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 3140, 19 F.P.E.R. 24013,
at 48 (1992); Martin Cnty. Educ. Ass'n (Martin Cnty. 1), 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 101 (1992),
rev'd, 613 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam); Pensacola Junior Coll.
Faculty Ass'n, 13 F.P.E.R. 18150, at 369 (1987).
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transferred to remedy the shortfall. 138 Moreover, the Commission has held
that even if there is a known problem of decreased revenue for the employer,
that fact alone is not enough to show a financial emergency.1
39
A good example of PERC's position on that issue is found in Martin
County Education Ass'n (Martin County 1). 140 In that case, the Martin Coun-
ty School Board, contrary to the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, unilaterally froze salaries for the upcoming year because of an antic-
ipated shortfall in the budget. 14' But PERC declined to find that the school
board faced an exigent circumstance, which would excuse its unilateral ac-
tion. 1 42 It noted that while it could "not intrude into the political decision-
making process of local school boards as they decide how to prioritize
spending," it did have the authority to determine whether a true emergency
existed. 14 In that case, the school board failed to show proof of a real emer-
gency that justified its action to bypass the bargaining process, because its
financial records showed a pool of unallocated funds large enough to cover
the cost of the contractual pay raises. 44 It did not matter that those funds
were from a budget other than the one from which they usually distributed
the pay raises.'45
B. Unilateral Action Allowed by Florida Statutes
Currently there are two Florida laws that create statutory exceptions to
the prohibition of unilateral action by a public employer over mandatory
subjects of bargaining: section 447.309(2), the Underfunding Statute, and
section 447.4095, the Financial Urgency Statute. 146 The latter was born from
the amendment of the first. 147 In that context, it is important to understand
138. Tarpon Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 3140, 19 F.P.E.R. 24013, at 48 (finding
that funds available from other budget sources, regardless of whether the city wanted to use
those funds, negated the existence of a financial exigency).
139. Id.
140. 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 99 (1992), rev'd, 613 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (per curiam).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 101.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Martin Cnty. 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 101.
146. See FLA. STAT. §§ 447.309(2), .4095 (2010).
147. See generally Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, §§ 1-2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1943,
1943-44 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § § 447.309(2)(a)-(b), .4095 (1995)).
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how governments used-or misused-the Underfunding Statute prior to its
amendment in 1995.148
1. The Underfunding Statute Prior to 1995
In an effort to resolve the inherent conflict 149 between the constitutional right
to bargain granted by Florida Constitution, article I, section 6, and the legis-
lature's power to appropriate funds granted by Florida Constitution, article
VII, section 1(c), 5° the legislature included the language codified in section
447.309(2) in the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA). 15' As original-
ly adopted, the statute read:
Upon execution of the collective bargaining agreement, the
chief executive shall, in his annual budget request or by other ap-
propriate means, request the legislative body to appropriate such
amounts as shall be sufficient to fund the provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. If less than the requested amount is
appropriated, the collective bargaining agreement shall be admi-
nistered by the chief executive officer on the basis of the amounts
appropriated by the legislative body. The failure of the legislative
body to appropriate funds sufficient to fund the collective bargain-
ing agreement shall not constitute nor be evidence of any unfair
labor practice.
152
The Underfunding Statute, as it was interpreted and applied prior to
1995, allowed a "legislative body"'153 to disregard the amount of funding pre-
148. See Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n (Sarasota Classi-
fied-Teachers Ass'n II), 614 So. 2d 1143, 1148 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
149. Id.
150. Id. "No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriation
made by law." FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1(c). "That provision, and the vesting of 'the legislative
powers of the state' in the Florida Legislature by [a]rticle HI, [slection 1, renders the appropri-
ation of State funds the exclusive constitutional prerogative of the Legislature." United Facul-
ty of Fla. v. Bd. of Regents, 365 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
151. Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), ch. 74-100, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 134, 144
(codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.201-.609 (1975)).
152. Id.
153. "Legislative body" is a term of art as used in Chapter 447 of the Florida Statutes.
The legislature defines the term in section 447.203:
"Legislative body" means the State Legislature, the board of county commissioners, the
district school board, the governing body of a municipality, or the governing body of an in-
strumentality or unit of government having authority to appropriate funds and establish policy
governing the terms and conditions of employment and which, as the case may be, is the ap-
propriate legislative body for the bargaining unit.
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viously agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement between the public
employer and the public employee, on the theory that a "legislative body"
could not be charged by the executive branch with an order to spend mon-
ey. 54 The First District Court of Appeal first interpreted the Underfunding
Statute in United Faculty of Florida v. Board of Regents155 in 1979 as it ap-
plied to the state government, creating a limitation on the constitutional right
of public employees to collectively bargain.
15 6
a. United Faculty of Florida v. Board of Regents
In Board of Regents, the First District held that a collective bargaining
agreement between the Board of Regents (BOR) and United Faculty of Flor-
ida (UFF)'57 does not strip the legislature of its appropriations power, but
instead, that agreement is subject to legislative funding. 158 Here, after exten-
sive negotiations and just before an impasse hearing, the parties reached an
agreement over pay increases.' 59 Pursuant to statutory duty, the governor
amended his budget to request appropriations from the legislature sufficient
to fund the parties' recent agreement."6° But instead of funding the requested
$6.6 million, the legislature appropriated only $5.1 million.16' UFF thereaf-
ter brought a charge against the State claiming that there was enough money
contained in the aggregate appropriations to fund the amount negotiated in
the contract.'62 BOR countered that the legislature had chosen to appropriate
FLA. STAT. § 447.203(10) (2010). So, by using that phrase in the Underfunding Statute, the
legislature-whether knowingly or not-essentially allowed that statute to apply to any of the
bodies named in section 447.203(10). See Bd. of Regents, 365 So. 2d at 1075.
154. See, e.g., Holmes Cnty. Teachers' Ass'n, 9 F.P.E.R. 14207, at 401 (1983) ("The
collective bargaining agreement to which the petitioner is a party did not divest the
[1]egislature of its constitutional powers in the appropriation of public monies" pursuant to
section 447.309(2).).
155. 365 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
156. Id. at 1077-79; Orta, supra note 54, at 281.
157. "The UFF is the certified bargaining agent [that] represents approximately 5,000
faculty and professional employees of the BOR." Bd. of Regents, 365 So. 2d at 1074.
158. Id. at 1078-79.
159. See id. at 1076.
160. Id. The governor was acting pursuant to his statutory duty under section 447.309(2),
which, prior to its 1995 amendment, read: "Upon execution of the collective bargaining
agreement, the chief executive shall, in his annual budget request or by other appropriate
means, request the legislative body to appropriate such amounts as shall be sufficient to fund
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 1075-76 n.4 (quoting FLA.
STAT. § 447.309(2) (1993) (amended 1995)).
161. Bd. of Regents, 365 So. 2d at 1077.
162. Id. at 1074.
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only a specific amount for use in implementing the contract from which it
could not stray.
163
The opinion began by noting that article VII, section 1 (c) of the Florida
Constitution grants to the Florida Legislature exclusive control over state
monies. 64 Acting under that power, the legislature "explicitly and unmistak-
ably" chose to underfund the negotiated agreement by $1.5 million, which it
had a constitutional right to do.' 65 The court held that collective bargaining
agreements do "not divest the [l]egislature of its constitutional powers" to
appropriate public funds; 66 they do not make "the exercise of legislative
discretion a simple ministerial function."'167 Instead, collective bargaining
agreements are always made subject to the legislature's appropriations au-
thority. 168 Any attempt by BOR to fund the contract at any other amount
would be a "blatant disregard" of that legislative power.' 69 Moreover, the
district court commented that even if the appropriations to fund the collective
bargaining agreement in question were free of restrictions, the court could
not demand that BOR pull funds from other appropriations to supplement
that agreement's funding. 7 ' It reasoned that such a ruling would cause irre-
concilable conflict among other funded agreements.' 7' Lastly, the court held
that the legislature's underfunding was not an impairment of the contracts
clause 72 since collective bargaining agreements are always contingent on
legislative appropriations, a fact well-known by both parties before they be-
gan negotiations. '
7
1
The district court's holding was not explicitly limited to the state gov-
ernment, 74 but at the same time, its language did not contemplate application
of the same theory to local government entities--especially those whose
163. Id.
164. Id. See infra accompanying text note 233 for the language of article VII, section
1(c).
165. Bd. of Regents, 365 So. 2d at 1077.
166. Id. at 1078-79.
167. Id. at 1079.
168. Id. at 1078.
169. Id.
170. Bd. of Regents, 365 So. 2d at 1078.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the
language of article I, section 10.
173. Bd. of Regents, 365 So. 2d at 1078.
174. See id. at 1079. The court concluded that "the collective bargaining agreement in
question incorporated the Constitution and laws of this State, the provisions of which commit
to the Florida Legislature the final say in the appropriation of State monies." Id.
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"public employer"'1 75 and "legislative body," pursuant to section 447.203 of
the Florida Statutes, are one in the same.'76 Nonetheless, the language of the
Underfunding Statute, prior to its 1995 amendment, provided the power to
underfund collective bargaining agreements to a "legislative body" and not
the "Legislature"-the latter implicating the state legislature. 7 7 "Legislative
body" is a term of art as it is used in PERA, with a precise definition that
includes several local governing bodies and those entities that can appropri-
ate funds and establish policy to regulate terms and conditions of employ-
ment.7 8 The combination of that statutory language with the United Faculty
of Florida decision paved the way for both state and local public bodies to
underfund or unilaterally change collective bargaining agreements under
section 447.309(2) of the Florida Statutes. 179
b. PERC Cases
In 1983, in a case of first impression, PERC found that a local school
board had underfunded a collective bargaining agreement in bad faith, and
thereby, in essence, had committed an unfair labor practice.Y° But, the
commission declined to award damages because the holding in Board of Re-
gents and section 447.309(2) prohibited it from using the evidence of the
underfunding to support an unfair labor practice charge against the board."'
In its opinion, PERC struggled with applying the Underfunding Statute to the
situation because the school board assumed both the role of public employer
and legislative body, especially because Board of Regents was decided on
the premise of the public employer and legislative body being independent
175. See supra note 83 for the language of section 447.203(2), which defines "public
employer" as it is used under PERA.
176. For instance, a county commission is both the public employer and legislative body
within the meaning of section 447.203. See FLA. STAT. § 447.203(2), (10). On the other hand,
a county sheriff s office only meets the definition of public employer and does not have the
authority under statute to act as the legislative body-the county commission typically will
serve as the sheriff s legislative body. See id.
177. See FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2) (1993) (amended 1995).
178. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(10) (2010). See supra note 153 for the text of section
447.203(10).
179. See, e.g., Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n II, 614 So. 2d 1143, 1146 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); Sch. Bd. of Martin Cnty. v. Martin Cnty. Educ. Ass'n (Martin Cnty. 11), 613
So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam); Holmes Cnty. Teachers' Ass'n, 9
F.P.E.R. 14207, at 397-98 (1983).
180. Holmes Cnty. Teachers'Ass'n, 9 F.P.E.R. 14207, at 400.
181. Id. at 401; FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2) (1993) (amended 1995) ("The failure of the legis-
lative body to appropriate funds sufficient to fund the collective bargaining agreement shall
not constitute, or be evidence of, any unfair labor practice.").
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identities. 182 Nonetheless, PERC found no evidence of legislative intent sur-
rounding section 447.309(2) to support an alternate funding procedure for
those agencies with independent identities, such as the State, and those agen-
cies that assume binary roles, like the school board, and so felt bound by the
holding in Board of Regents.'83
The commission, however, did express its discontent with how the Un-
derfunding Statute was being applied. 84 It noted its holding conflicted with
the notion of good faith bargaining because it allowed a public employer
who is also the legislative body to agree to a salary provision and then refuse
to fund it.'85 Moreover, it found the application of the Underfunding Statute
in this regard to be adverse to public employees' constitutional rights under
article I, section 6:
[T]he ability to require a public employer to live up to its econom-
ic contractual commitments [is] an important right that Florida's
public employees should have, as do its private employees. Em-
ployees of a private sector employer in Florida ... can force their
employer to implement negotiated monetary provisions of a con-
tract. However, similarly situated public employees apparently
possess no similar right, due to a legislative body's prerogative,
granted by [s]ection 447.309(2), to underfund a contract.... The
stability of labor relations is enhanced if negotiated contracts vo-
luntarily entered into must be fully implemented.
186
PERC's finding that the Underfunding Statute, as it was being applied,
constituted an abridgment of public employees' rights under article I, section
6, carried over to 1992 when it again had an opportunity to deal with the
application of the Underfunding Statute.'87 That year, two local school
boards came before PERC to defend their unilateral actions, claiming their
actions were justified under section 447.309(2) and under the exigent cir-
cumstances exception.'88 In both Martin County I and Sarasota Classified-
Teachers Ass'n v. Sarasota County School District (Sarasota Classified-
182. Holmes Cnty. Teachers' Ass'n, 9 F.P.E.R. 14207, at 400-01.
183. Id. at 401.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 402-03 n.8 (citations omitted).
187. See Martin Cnty. I, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 100 (1992), rev'd, 613 So. 2d 521 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam); see generally Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n I, 18
F.P.E.R. 123069, at 123 (1992), rev'd, 614 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
188. See Martin Cnty. 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 100-01; Sarasota Classified-Teachers
Ass'n 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23069, at 123.
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Teachers Ass'n I),89 PERC applied a very narrow construction to the statute,
resulting in decisions that section 447.309(2) did not apply in either situa-
tion. 9° Both cases, however, were reversed-arguably mistakenly-by Flor-
ida Courts of Appeal.19'
In Martin County I, the school board unilaterally decided to freeze
teachers' salaries while the parties were engaged in reopener negotiations
over wages. 92 The freeze eliminated teachers' annual experience salary in-
creases, which they had been receiving since 1982.193 The school board de-
fended the union's unfair labor practice charge on the grounds that its action
was permissible under section 447.309(2). 1 4 PERC-noting the statute's
potential interference with the teachers' constitutional rights to collectively
bargain-strictly limited its application of the statute to the narrow facts of
the case.'95 Under that standard, PERC decided the statute applied to only
bargaining agreements that had been executed by both parties.' 96 And since
the parties in this case were still negotiating the issue of wages under the
reopener provision, they had not yet executed an agreement.' 97 The school
board appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.' 98
The district court disagreed with PERC and declared that the Under-
funding Statute applied to any collective bargaining agreement, so long as
that agreement had at one point been executed by both parties. 199 In the case
at hand, since the parties had executed the original agreement well before the
reopener negotiations, section 447.309(2) applied, and the union could not
use underfunding as evidence of an unfair labor practice against the school
board.200
189. 18 F.P.E.R. 23069, at 121 (1992), rev'd, 614 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
190. Martin Cnty. 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 100; Sarasota Classified-Teachers' Ass'n I,
18 F.P.E.R. 23069, at 123.
191. Martin Cnty. II, 613 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam);
Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n 1I, 614 So. 2d 1143, 1149 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
192. Martin Cnty. 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 99.
193. Id. at 99, 101.
194. Id. at 99.
195. Id. at 100.
196. See id.
197. Martin Cnty. 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 100.
198. Martin Cnty. II, 613 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam).
199. Id. at 523. ("After a collective bargaining agreement is negotiated and concluded in
good faith, section 447.309(2) prevents any subsequent legislative underfunding from being
used as evidence of an unfair labor practice against the public employer.").
200. Id.
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PERC's review of Sarasota Classified-Teachers Association I followed
soon after.20' There, the school board and the union entered into a three-year
agreement, and each year the school board appropriated funds sufficient to
fund the step increases contained within the provisions of the contract.20 2
But, after the contract expired-during the status quo period-the school
board decided to eliminate the increases.2 3 When the union filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the school board, it defended its unilateral ac-
tion as permissible under section 44 7 .3 09 (2).204
Similar to its decision in Martin County I, PERC declared that the Un-
derfunding statute impaired the constitutional right of public employees to
collectively bargain and so gave the statute a strict construction.2 5 Since the
language in statute referred repeatedly to the application of a collective bar-
gaining agreement, PERC determined it did not apply to the status quo pe-
riod while the parties were engaged in negotiations. 2°6 Therefore, the school
board could not use section 447.309(2) to defend its action and was subject
to an unfair labor practice.20 7 The school board appealed to the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal.208
The district court disapproved of PERC's narrow construction of sec-
tion 447.309(2) and instead interpreted it broadly. 21 It held that a legislative
body may choose to underfund a collective bargaining agreement in any cir-
cumstance so long as the circumstance deals with a collective bargaining
situation in which the employer is requested to appropriate funds.210 Its hold-
ing thereby extended the application of the underfunding statute to the status
quo period, and the school board successfully defended its unilateral change
to the status quo under section 447.309(2). l l
Obvious distinctions appear when comparing PERC's reasoning to the
district courts' reasoning in the Martin County I and Sarasota Classified-
201. Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n I, 18 F.P.E.R. 23069, at 121 (1992), rev'd, 614
So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
202. Id. at 125 (recommendation of Cheatham, Hearing Officer).
203. Id. at 122.
204. Id. at 123.
205. Id.
206. Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n I, 18 F.P.E.R. 23069, at 123.
207. Id.
208. Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n II, 614 So. 2d 1143, 1146 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
209. See id. at 1146.
210. Id. at 1149.
211. See id.
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Teachers Ass'n I cases.212 PERC maintained that the Underfunding Statute
as it applied to local governments abridged public employees' rights under
article I, section 6, and thus required a strict interpretation.2 13 And interes-
tingly enough, it was PERC, and not the appellate courts, that applied the
Supreme Court of Florida's standard that requires a compelling state interest
214in order to destroy an employee's right to effective collective bargaining.
On the other hand, the district courts applied broad, generous interpreta-
tions, thereby expanding the rights of public employers under section
447.309(2) without ever considering the interference with public employees'
constitutional rights.215 The courts also explicitly approved the application
216of the statute to local public agencies. The cumulative effect of the courts'
decisions permitted section 447.309(2) to be applied in a way that rendered
ineffective public employees' constitutional right to collectively bargain-
217holdings contrary to Supreme Court of Florida's precedent. A public em-
ployer that both negotiates and funds a collective bargaining contract could
now unilaterally underfund it at any time, and for any reason, and would be
protected from an unfair labor charge pursuant to the Underfunding Sta-
tute.
218
C. Application to State Government
Right around the same time as the decisions in Martin County I and Sa-
rasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n I, the Supreme Court of Florida was pon-
dering the same statute as it applied to the state government.219 The court's
212. Compare Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n I, 18 F.P.E.R. 23069, at 123 with
Martin Cnty. I, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 100 (1992), rev'd, 613 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (per curiam).
213. Id.; see also Holmes Cnty. Teachers' Ass'n, 9 F.P.E.R. 14207, at 401 (1983).
214. Martin Cnty. 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 100 (remembering the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision "that the constitutional right of public employees to collectively bargain is
not to be abrogated absent a compelling state interest") (citation omitted).
215. See Martin Cnty. H, 613 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam);
Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n H, 614 So. 2d 1143, 1146 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
216. See Martin Cnty. II, 613 So. 2d at 523 ("This statute makes no exception for the
situation involved herein where the public employer wears two hats, one as the public em-
ployer, and the other as the legislative body.").
217. Hillsborough Cnty. Govtl. Emps. Ass'n v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 522
So. 2d 358, 363 (Fla. 1988) ("The Florida Constitution guarantees public employees the right
of effective collective bargaining.").
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla. PBA), 613 So. 2d 415,416 (Fla.
1992).
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holdings in two cases during late 1992 and 1993 called into question the
220holdings of the two 1993 school board cases.
1. State v. Florida PBA
The PBA ratified a three-year collective bargaining agreement with the
state, effective from 1987-1990.221 In 1988, the legislature passed an appro-
priations act that did not underfund the agreement, but instead, modified the
leave bank provisions of the contract.222 The Court decided, however, that
this presented a unique situation because the legislature had used its appropr-
iations power unilaterally to change the terms of the contract and not to un-
223derfund it, as seen in previous cases.
The PBA brought an action against the State claiming that it had ab-
ridged its members' constitutional rights to collectively bargain under the
Florida Constitution because the legislature did not show a compelling state
interest before acting.224 Both the trial court and the district court agreed
with the PBA that the State, by unilaterally modifying the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, abrogated the PBA members' fundamental
rights under article I, section 6.225 The State appealed to the Supreme Court
of Florida, which reversed and remanded the district court's decision.226
The majority opinion in this case spent a great deal of time making dis-
tinctions between the rights of private and public employees under article I,
section 6-particularly in the area of funding collective bargaining agree-
ments. 27 It stated that unlike the private sector, a public employees' union
220. See id. at 415-16; see Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 672-73 (Fla.
1993).
221. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 416; see generally Orta, supra note 54 (comprehensively
analyzing this case).
222. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 416. The legislature reduced the hours of personal leave and
increased the hours of sick leave that employees accumulated on a monthly basis. Id. It also
eliminated accrued sick leave that totaled more than 240 hours and eliminated the requirement
that employees submit doctors' notes when using sick time. Id.
223. Id. at 420.
224. Id. at 416, 419 n.6. The PBA depended on the Court's holding in Hillsborough
County Governmental Employees Ass'n v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 522 So.
2d 358, 362 (Fla. 1988), that a public agency must show a compelling state interest in order to
abridge employees' fundamental right to collectively bargain. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 419
n.6; Hillsborough Cnty. Govtl. Emps. Ass'n, 522 So. 2d at 362.
225. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 416.
226. Id. at 421.
227. See id. at 416-19.
The fact that public employee bargaining is protected under Florida's Constitution does
not require us to ignore universally recognized distinctions between public and private em-
ployees. The constitutional right to bargain must be construed in accordance with all provi-
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could never require the legislature to fund a collective bargaining agreement
because that would involve the executive branch invading legislative territo-
ry-an act forbidden by the separation of powers doctrine.22 8 In order to
229maintain the integrity of that doctrine, the Court reasoned that collective
bargaining agreements must be subject to the legislature's constitutional right
to appropriate public funds.23°
The Court reconciled its holding in Florida PBA with its previous hold-
ing in Hillsborough County Governmental Employees Ass'n,23 1 in which it
necessitated a public employer to show a compelling state interest before
abridging employees' constitutional rights to collectively bargain.232 The
Court explained that the public agency in this case did not act contrary to that
standard "because the exercise of legislative power over appropriations is not
an abridgment of the right to bargain, but an inherent limitation," and, so, the
Hillsborough County Governmental Employees Ass'n holding did not ap-
sions of the constitution. Surely it was not intended to alter fundamental constitutional prin-
ciples, such as the separation of powers doctrine.... This fact in and of itself necessitates a
realization that public and private bargaining is inherently different.
Id. at 418. The decision was split 4-3. See id. at 421-22. Justice Grimes wrote the majority
opinion; Justices Overton, McDonald, and Harding concurred. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 416,
421. Justice Kogan wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Barkett and Shaw. Id. at 422.
228. Id. at 418-19. Florida's separation of powers doctrine is encompassed in article II,
section 3 of its constitution, which reads: "The powers of the state government shall be di-
vided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly pro-
vided herein." FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
229. In Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991), the Court
opined the significance of preserving the separation of powers doctrine: "The fundamental
concern of keeping the individual branches separate is that the fusion of the powers of any two
branches into the same department would ultimately result in the destruction of liberty." Id. at
263.
230. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 418-19. Article VII, section l(c) of the Florida Constitution
reads: "No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriation
made by law." FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(c). The Court explained section 1(c) in a 1935 opi-
nion, finding that:
[t]he object of a constitutional provision requiring an appropriation made by law as the
authority to withdraw money from the state treasury is to prevent the expenditure of the public
funds already in the treasury, or potentially therein from tax sources provided to raise it, with-
out the consent of the public given by their representatives in formal legislative acts. Such a
provision secures to the [legislature] . . . the exclusive power of deciding how, when, and for
what purpose the public funds shall be applied in carrying on the government.
Children, 589 So. 2d at 265 (quoting State ex rel. Kurz v. Lee, 163 So. 859, 868 (Fla. 1935)
(en banc)).
231. 522 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1988).
232. Id. at 362.
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ply. 233 The Court, however, added one caveat to its conclusion: "[S]hould
the legislatively mandated change fall outside the appropriations power, it
would constitute an abridgment of the right to bargain and would therefore
be subject to the compelling state interest test [under Hillsborough County
Governmental Employees Ass 'n].
Having no precedent to follow on the legislature's unilateral modifica-
tion of a mandatory subject of bargaining, the Court looked to a Supreme
Court of New Jersey case for guidance.235 From there it adopted a funding
test that purportedly offered "a reasonable accommodation of both the right
to collectively bargain and the legislature's exclusive control over the public
purse., 236 The test is: if the legislature appropriates enough money to fund
the benefit as negotiated then, it may not unilaterally alter the benefit; but, if
it does not appropriate enough funds-which is within its right to do-then
the legislature may unilaterally change the negotiated benefit, even to the
237
extent that it becomes contrary to the original intent of the parties.
Three months after the Florida PBA decision, the Court in Chiles would
adopt yet another test in an attempt to balance the legislature's appropriations
power with the collective bargaining rights of public employees.238
2. The Chiles Case
The State and one of its unions, United Faculty of Florida (UFF),
reached an impasse over their collective bargaining agreement for fiscal year
1991-1992.239 In resolving the impasse, the legislature authorized a three
percent pay raise for UFF employees effective the first of January 1992.240
The decision was reduced to writing and inserted into the collective bargain-
ing agreement, which UFF members soon ratified.241 Following its resolu-
tion of the impasse, however, the legislature delayed the effective date of the
233. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 419 n.6. Justice Kogan disagreed with the majority's recon-
ciliation with Hillsborough County Governmental Employees Ass'n. Id. at 423 (Kogan, J.,
dissenting). Kogan reminded the Court of its decision that "'[t]he right to bargain collectively
is, as a part of the state constitution's declaration of rights, a fundamental right. As such it is
subject to official abridgement only upon a showing of a compelling state interest .... ' Id.
(quoting Hillsborough Cnty. Govtl. Emps. Ass'n, 522 So. 2d at 362).
234. Id. at 419 n.6 (majority opinion).
235. Id. at 420-21 (citing State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 453 A.2d 176 (N.J.
1982)).
236. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 421.
237. Id.
238. See Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993).
239. Id. at 672.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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pay raises until February 1992, in response to new information concerning an
242
expected shortfall in revenue. When the fiscal problems continued to es-
calate, the legislature unilaterally decided to eliminate the pay raises alto-
gether.1
43
UFF filed suit claiming that the legislature's action was unconstitutional
as an abridgment of article I, sections 6 and 10 of the Florida Constitution.2"
The trial court ruled in the union's favor finding that the legislature's act
"violated the right to collectively bargain and constituted an impermissible
impairment of contract., 245 The State appealed to the district court, which
certified the case for immediate review by the Supreme Court of Florida.246
Before proceeding with its decision, the Court noted that the situation at
hand was different from Florida PBA, because, unlike that case, the newer
case dealt with a collective bargaining agreement that had already been
funded before being unilaterally changed and eventually "unilaterally abro-
gated by the legislature.
247
Justice Kogan refused to acknowledge the State's argument that collec-
tive bargaining agreements never reach the level of fully binding contracts.248
Instead, he announced that "[o]nce the executive has negotiated and the leg-
islature has accepted and funded an agreement, the state and all its organs are
bound by that agreement under the principles on contract law."24 9 On that
note, he accentuated the importance of the right to contract in Florida, find-
ing it "one of the most sacrosanct rights guaranteed by our fundamental law"
and confirming that the legislature was severely limited in its ability "to
eliminate a contractual obligation it has itself created., 250 But on the other
side of that argument, Justice Kogan expressed concern that the legislature,
in its continuing obligation to fund collective bargaining contracts, would be
unable "to deal with bona fide [fiscal] emergencies. 25'
Balancing these competing interests, the Court held that the legislature
could choose to underfund a collective bargaining contract that was already
funded, but only in situations in which it could justify its action by a compel-
ling state interest and prove that no reasonable alternative was available-in
other words, the funds must not be obtainable from any other possible
242. Id.
243. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 672.
244. Id. See supra note 28 for the language of article 1, section 10.
245. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 672.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 672-73.
250. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 673 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10).
251. Id.
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source. 252 Otherwise, the abrogation of a collective bargaining contract is not
permitted.253 In applying such a test to the facts of the case, the Court did not
find a compelling state interest that required the legislature to modify the
existing collective bargaining contract.254 The majority did not give a reason
for that decision, but Justice Grimes in his concurring opinion shed some
light by noting that the collective bargaining contract needed only $35.4 mil-
lion for implementation-a small amount compared to the state's more than
$28 billion budget.255 That situation, he reasoned, did not give rise to a com-
pelling state interest requiring the repudiation of a binding contract. 6
3. The Standards of the Chiles & Florida PBA Tests
The Court's decisions from the Chiles and Florida PBA cases clarify
the statutory method, pursuant to section 447.309(2), for public entities to
unilaterally-and constitutionally-underfund a collective bargaining
agreement or underfund or alter the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment once it has become a binding contract. 7 Basically, the Florida PBA
test regulates a situation in which the legislature's appropriations power,
granted in article VII, section l(c) of the Florida Constitution,258 acts as an
inherent limitation to a collective bargaining agreement to preserve the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine.25 9 Alternatively, the Chiles test deals with a situa-
tion in which the legislature is not acting according to its appropriations
power, in which case, the separation of powers doctrine is not threatened. 6 °
Both of these tests apply to the state level of government because the state
government follows a strong separation of powers doctrine where the execu-
tive, judicial, and legislative branches function independently of one anoth-
er. 
26 1
Essentially, local governments-which do not experience the same se-
paration of powers issues as state governments-do not have the authority to
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 674 (Grimes, J., concurring).
256. Id.
257. See id. at 673 (majority opinion); State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla. PBA),
613 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1992); see also FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2) (2010).
258. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (c). See supra note 230 for the text of article VII, section
1(c).
259. See Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 419 n.6.
260. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 673.
261. See id.; Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 419.
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act under Florida PBA.262 The Chiles test, however, applies to both local and
state governments since the state government has the option to act outside of
its appropriations power.263
The Florida PBA test is based on the idea that the separation of powers
doctrine imposes an inherent limitation on a collective bargaining agree-
ment-restricting its ability to become a binding contract until the legislature
has exercised its appropriations power.264  Accordingly, if the legislature
chooses to underfund a collective bargaining agreement it may do so without
violating fundamental rights to collectively bargain or contract.265 Similarly,
in cases in which it has underfunded a collective bargaining contract it may
impose conditions on the use of that funding even if the conditions conflict
with the original terms of the agreement-resulting in a permissible unilater-
al change to that agreement.
266
Reflecting a standard opposite of that in Florida PBA, the Chiles test
applies to situations that do not involve the separation of powers doctrine-
when the legislature's appropriations power is not at issue.267 In those in-
stances, the Court affords a clear preference to employees' constitutional
rights to contract and collectively bargain.268 Once the legislature appro-
priates funds sufficient to support the negotiated agreement, the agreement
262. Citizens for Reform v. Citizens for Open Gov't, Inc., 931 So. 2d 977, 989-90 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The district court based its holding on the concept that the "Constitu-
tional separation of powers simply does not exist at the local government level." Id. at 989. It
concluded that a mayor and a county commission are not "mutually exclusive" entities; rather,
both act as the "governing body." Id. at 990. The court supported its holding with multiple
decisions from other jurisdictions. Id. at 989-90; see also 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:3 (West 3d ed. 2006) (internal footnotes omitted) ("Histor-
ically, the constitutional principle of the separation of powers has not been applied to the
government of cities. The rationale is that separation of powers reduces the threat of an un-
checked governing body, but that threat is slight where the governing body is subordinated to
the powers of a higher level of government.") (footnotes omitted).
263. See Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 672-73.
264. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 421.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 673. Although enumerated in Chiles, the Chiles test is also
supported by the holding in Florida PBA. The Hillsborough County Governmental Em-
ployees Ass'n holding that a public agency must show a compelling state interest before ab-
ridging employees' right to collectively bargain
is inapplicable here, because the exercise of legislative power over appropriations is not an ab-
ridgment of the right to bargain, but an inherent limitation. Of course, should the legislatively
mandated change fall outside the appropriations power, it would constitute an abridgment of
the right to bargain and would therefore be subject to the compelling state interest test.
Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 419 n.6.
268. See Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 673-74.
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becomes a binding contract that is enforceable under article I, section 10, as
would be any other contract formed in the state.269
Once the agreement is funded and becomes a binding contract, the only
way the legislature can unilaterally alter its provisions or rescind monies
already provided is by demonstrating a compelling state interest and no via-
ble alternative to abrogating the contract.27° Justice Kogan noted the Court's
commitment to such a standard:
The present case does not itself present a violation of separation of
powers, nor are we attempting a judicial appropriation of public
money. Here, the legislature acted pursuant to its powers, appro-
priated funds for collective bargaining agreements, and thereby
created a binding contract. Having exercised its appropriation
powers, the legislature cannot now change its mind and renege on
the contract so created without sufficient reason. Separation of
powers does not allow the unilateral and unjustified legislative ab-
rogation of a valid contract. 2
71
The Court's decisions in Florida PBA and Chiles are significant be-
cause they draw distinctions between the two levels of government and how
and when each may underfund or unilaterally change a collective bargaining
agreement or contract.272 Two years following those decisions, the Florida
Legislature amended the Underfunding Statute to apply to only the state gov-
ernment.273 The same bill proposed a new statute, section 447.4095-the
Financial Urgency Statute-which seemingly provided local government
flexibility in dealing with labor contracts during times of "financial urgen-
cy," perhaps to compensate for its loss of access to the Underfunding Sta-
tute.
274
269. Id. at 673.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.;Fla. PBA, 613So. 2dat421.
273. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, § l(2)(b), 1995 Fla. Laws 1943, 1943 (codi-
fied as amended at FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2)(b) (1995)).
274. Id. § 2 at 1943-44 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (1995)).
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V. THE FINANCIAL URGENCY STATUTE
A. How It Was Created
The 1995 Legislature considered two bills, House Bill 1267275 and Se-
nate Bill 888,276 which proposed amendments to the Underfunding Statute in
section 447.309(2) and recommended the creation of the Financial Urgency
Statute in section 447.4095.277 The effect of either bill, in part, restricted
278
application of the Underfunding Statute to only local-level government.
Essentially, the modification would remove a local government's ability un-
der the statute to bypass the impasse procedure by engaging in a bargaining
process faqade with the union, "agreeing" to a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and then simply underfunding or unilaterally changing anything in that
agreement with which it did not agree. 279 Additionally, the bills' effects
would remove from local governments the protection against unions' unfair
280labor practice charges for governments' conduct pursuant to the statute.
Teachers' unions and public safety unions like the PBA supported the
bills and applauded the legislature's recognition of local government's mi-
suse of the Underfunding Statute.281 On the other hand, non-supporters like
the Florida League of Cities, Florida Public Employer Labor Relations Asso-
ciation, and the Florida Association of Counties282 complained that the pro-
posed changes would expose local public employers to unfair labor practice
charges if they underfunded their collective bargaining agreements for any
275. Fla. HR Comm. on Govtl. Ops., H.B. 1267 (1995) Staff Analysis (Mar. 23, 1995) (on
file with State Archives) [hereinafter Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis].
276. Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., SB 888 (1995) Staff Analysis (Mar. 27, 1995) (on file
with State Archives) [hereinafter Govtl. Ops. Comm. SB 888 Staff Analysis].
277. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, §§ 1-3, 1995 Fla. Laws 1943, 1943-44 (codi-
fied as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.309(2)(a)-(b), .4095 (1995)).
278. See id.; Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 1.
279. See Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 1. See, e.g.,
Holmes Cnty. Teachers' Ass'n, 9 F.P.E.R. 14207, at 397 (1983). In Holmes County Teach-
ers' Ass'n, the employer and legislative body had an understanding that pursuant to section
447.309(2), it would not have to pay a contracted pay raise if the legislative body determined
at the time the pay raise was due that there was not adequate funding. Id. Based on the un-
derstanding, the employer agreed with the bargaining agent to provide teachers with a contrac-
tual pay raise. Id. But when the time came to pass the respective budget, the legislative body
failed to appropriate an amount necessary to fund the contractual pay raise. Id.
280. See Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, §§ 1(2)(b), 2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1943-44;
Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 1.
281. See Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 4.
282. Id.
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reason.283  That ;.-.ald result in an independent third-party forcing a public
employer to fund the contract by raising taxes or cutting services.284 For
example, some local governments, like sheriffs' departments, have indepen-
dent entities acting as their "public employers" and "legislative bodies," sim-
ilar to the state.285 Those public employers have no control over how their
legislative bodies appropriate funds, and so changing the Underfunding Sta-
tute to apply to only state-level government would make those employers
liable to the union for decisions made by separate entities.286
The proposed bills also ruffled some practicing labor attorneys-
unexpectedly from the union side-who were wary of the bills' practical
implications. Up until then, some labor attorneys had figured out how to
bypass the local government's misuse of the Underfunding Statute: Under
section 447.309(2), the union could not use evidence of underfunding to sup-
port an unfair labor practice charge against the employer, but the statute's
silence as to grievances presupposed permission to proceed to arbitration.287
283. Issue Statement, Fla. League of Cities et al., A Complicated Process: HB 47 (Hea-
ley) and SB 888 (Gutman) (on file with State Archives) [hereinafter A Complicated Process].
284. Id.
285. See Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 2; see generally
A Complicated Process, supra note 286.
286. See Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 3. This problem
was not remedied in the final version of the adopted Financial Urgency statute. As such,
constitutional officers like a sheriff fall through the cracks in the statute's language, as is
common with several of the statutes found in chapter 447. For instance, a sheriff s department
is granted its budget from the county commission, yet the sheriff is the "public employer" that
negotiates and enters into contracts with its employees, not the commissioners. Under the
Financial Urgency statute, then, is a sheriff authorized to declare a "financial urgency" when it
is not the body with the power to increase or decrease its budget? This topic is addressed here
only in a footnote because the issues and questions created therefrom are too many to list and
discuss here.
287. See Palm Beach Cnty. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Palm Beach Cnty. PBA), 101 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 78, 85 (1993) (Abrams, Arb.). In his award, Arbitrator Roger Abrams ad-
dressed section 447.309(2) as it related to arbitrations:
None of the opinions addressing on [s]ection 447.309(2) offer a definitive reading of the
legislative intent, in particular with regard to contract liability as determined in arbitration.
The last sentence in the [s]ection 447.309(2) paragraph does clarify the purpose of the provi-
sion, however.... [It] appears to have been designed to keep... [PERC] out of the business
of second guessing the legislative judgments of local municipalities. It does not free the [c]ity
from its contract obligations that might be perfected in another forum, such as arbitration.
The [c]ity argues that [s]ection 447.309(2) cannot be limited to unfair labor practice cas-
es because otherwise it would be a nullity .... The argument ignores issues of institutional
competence, allocation of decisional power, and the intent of the negotiating parties. The
[Ilegislature might have wanted to keep PERC out of intragovemmental funding disputes. It
might have thought that arbitrators were better able to resolve these types of disputes. It might
have allowed the parties' intentions to control with regard to the appropriate forum for resolu-
tion. In any case, the [s]ection talks about unfair labor practice liability. That was the
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That silence, paired with the fact that arbitration awards are very difficult to
288
overturn, resulted in a successful arbitration strategy: an arbitrator who
had occasion to decide whether a legislative body could legally underfund a
collective bargaining agreement issued decisions overwhelmingly in favor of
bargaining agents.289
The proposed bills would ultimately put that strategy in jeopardy and
force labor attorneys back to their drawing boards.29 °
Despite the negative attention, the legislature passed Senate Bill 888 ef-
fective as of July 1, 1995.291 The bill includes two sections and encompasses
two statutes, each granting a different level of government the opportunity to
make unilateral changes to collective bargaining agreements or contracts-
and each under a different set of standards.
Section 1 of the bill split the Underfunding Statute, section 447.309(2),
into two parts.293 The first part, now designated as subsection (2)(a), kept the
language that required the chief executive officer to request funds from the
designated legislative body sufficient to implement the negotiated agree-
ment.294 Subsection (2)(a) still applies to both levels of government.295 Sub-
section (2)(b) also kept the general language of the original statute but made
it applicable to only the Florida Legislature.296 Subsection (2)(b) concludes
with a statutory adoption of the Court's holding in Florida PBA, mandating
that "[a]ll collective bargaining agreements entered into by the state are sub-
ject to the appropriations powers of the Legislature. 297
In section 2 of the Bill, the Legislature created section 447.4095-the
Financial Urgency Statute-in order to provide local governments a similar
opportunity to make unilateral changes to a collective bargaining contract in
[1]egislature's plain intention, even if it did not totally free municipalities from fulfilling their
promises.
Id. Mr. Abrams is a highly respected arbitrator in the Florida labor community.
288. See Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 1989).
289. See, e.g., Palm Beach Cnty. PBA, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 88; Deerfield Beach
Firefighters, Local 1673, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1189, 1191 (1992) (Frost, Arb.).
290. See Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 3.
291. See Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, § 1-3, 1995 Fla. Laws 1943, 1943 (codi-
fied as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.309(2)(a)-(b), .4095 (1995)).
292. See id. §§ 1-2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1943-44.
293. See id. § 1, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1943.
294. See id.
295. See id. § 1, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1943.
296. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, § 2(b), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1943. Compare
FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2)(b) (1993) (amended 1995) (using the term "legislative body"), with
FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2)(b) (1995) (amended 1997) (using the term "legislature").
297. Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, § 1(2)(b), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1943; State v.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla. PBA), 613 So. 2d. 415, 418 (Fla. 1992).
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cases of financial emergencies. 298 The language of the Financial Urgency
Statute, as adopted in 1995, remains the same today:
In the event of a financial urgency requiring modification of an
agreement, the chief executive officer... and the bargaining agent
... shall meet as soon as possible to negotiate the impact of the fi-
nancial urgency. If after a reasonable period of negotiation which
shall not exceed [fourteen] days, a dispute exists between the pub-
lic employer and the bargaining agent, an impasse shall be deemed
to have occurred, and one of the parties shall so declare in writing
to the other party and to the commission. The parties shall then
proceed pursuant to the provisions of s[ection] 447.403 [which re-
gulates the procedures of impasse]. An unfair labor practice
charge shall not be filed during the [fourteen] days during which
negotiations are occurring pursuant to this section.
299
The language in that statute is vague, particularly in the expression "fi-
nancial urgency"-a problem identified by a senate committee for Senate
Bill 888 prior to its enactment. 300 The committee considered the term so
vague that it could not clarify whether it applied to employers, employees,
the Florida Legislature, legislative bodies-or to them all.30' Additionally, if
it did apply to employers, could the committee unilaterally declare it did
without the support of its legislative body?302 Furthermore, the committee
struggled with whether "urgency" meant an employer could use it when fac-
ing an adverse emergency situation, or whether "urgency" envisioned a situa-
tion in which a bargaining agent could act in response to an unexpected
windfall to the public employer.30 3 Regardless of the identified flaws, the
legislature passed Senate Bill 888 without correction or clarification and
298. See Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1943-44.
299. Compare FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (1995) (amended 1997), with FLA. STAT. § 447.4095
(2010). See generally FLA. STAT. § 447.403 (2010) (regulating the proceedings of impasse).
300. Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl.Ops. Comm., SB 888 (1995) Staff Analysis 3 (Mar. 27,
1995) (on file with State Archives) [hereinafter Govtl. Ops. Comm. SB 888 Staff Analysis].
Compare id. (declaring the term "financial urgency," as used in the statute, vague), with FLA.
STAT. § 447.4095 (2010) (using the vague term "financial urgency" without providing a defi-
nition).
301. Govtl. Ops. Comm. SB 888 Staff Analysis, supra note 300, at 3.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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explicitly left the interpretation of the statute "to practice."'' " After several
years of lying dormant, "in practice" is just where the statute is today. °5
B. Case One: Communications Workers of America v. Indian River
School Board
Several years went by after the passage of Senate Bill 888 without much
attention to the new Financial Urgency Statute.0 6 Then, in 2002, the statute
popped up before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Communications
Workers of America v. Indian River County School Board.3 7 This case cen-
tered on an arbitrator's award that opined the school board violated the terms
of an existing collective bargaining agreement by unilaterally changing its
employees' health insurance benefits.30 8 The school board argued that its
action was permissible under section 447.4095 of the Florida Statutes and
appealed the lower court's finding that the arbitrator exceeded his authori-
ty.3' The district court agreed, reasoning that the board's reliance on the
Financial Urgency Statute removed the issue from the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion and into PERC's.
310
Communications Workers did not discuss the merits of the Financial
Urgency Statute, but instead proposed that a union's remedy for a public
employer's action, pursuant to the Financial Urgency Statute, is through
PERC as an unfair labor practice and not through the courts as a contract
violation. 3 ' The decision essentially terminated the potential for labor attor-
neys to treat the Financial Urgency Statute as they used to treat the Under-
funding Statute. 32 An attorney would not be able to resurrect his or her once
successful strategy of treating unilateral action as a contract violation settled
304. Id.
305. Id.; see generally Commc'ns Workers v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 888 So. 2d 96
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2005), but failing to define "ur-
gency").
306. See Ruby, supra note 13, at 10.
307. 888 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
308. Id. at 98.
309. Id. at 99.
310. Id. at 100. Here, the court based its decision largely on a 1976 Fourth District Court
of Appeal decision that conferred upon PERC preemptive jurisdiction if the activities alleged
in the complaint "are 'arguably' covered by the provisions of Part II, Chapter 447," Florida
Statutes. Id.; Maxwell v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 330 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (interpreting part II, chapter 447, Florida Statutes).
311. Commc'ns Workers, 888 So. 2dat 101.
312. Id. (holding that "PERC has preemptive authority, retains jurisdiction and has the
exclusive decision-making power to defer to arbitration").
[Vol. 35
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/9
LABOR RELATIONS IN FLORIDA'S PUBLIC SECTOR
through arbitration, but would now have to face the risk of an unfavorable
statutory interpretation by PERC.313
C. Case Two, PERC's Interpretation: Manatee Education Ass'n v. School
District of Manatee County
1. Facts
The case of Manatee Education Ass'n v. School District of Manatee
County314 came before PERC in 2009, presenting the opportunity to issue a
decision of first impression regarding the Financial Urgency Statute.315 The
union in this case, Manatee Education Ass'n (MEA), represented teachers
and paraprofessionals working within the Manatee County School District
(the District).3?16 In 2007, those parties entered into a three year collective
bargaining agreement set to expire in 2010.3" The contract contained a
"reopener clause for salary issues effective on or before June 1 of each
year. ' '318 At the beginning of 2008, the District learned that it would face a
severe revenue deficit for the 2008-09 fiscal year.3 19 To make matters
worse, in order to meet its contract obligations for the current fiscal year, the
District had to withdraw money from its reserve fund, which left the fund
unlawfully inadequate.32° Ultimately, the District faced a $21.5 million dol-
lar deficit for the 2008-09 fiscal year.32'
The provisions of the collective bargaining contract between the parties
obliged the District to provide those represented employees pay steps for the
2008-09 fiscal year at a cost of $8 million dollars, which it could not af-
ford.322 The District concluded that in lieu of layoffs it would implement an
across-the-board salary reduction in order to maintain its level of service and
balance its budget, and it wanted to do so quickly before the new school year
began.323 Otherwise, the pay steps would automatically take place and the
pursuing retroactive salary reduction would result in loss of paychecks for
313. See id.
314. 35 F.P.E.R. 46, at 86 (2009).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 87.
317. Initial Brief of Appellant at 4, Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 46 (2009) (No.
ID09-1435).
318. Id.
319. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R 46, at 91.
320. Id. at 92.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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many teachers-a disruption the District sought to avoid.324 Accordingly, the
District sent a notification to MEA declaring a financial urgency under sec-
tion 447.4095 of the Florida Statutes and requested a date to begin the four-
teen day bargaining process.325
The MEA declined to bargain under the Financial Urgency statute.326 It
opined that the District's act was premature since the governor had yet to
sign the budget and because it presented no proof to the union that it was in
such a dire state.3 27 After fourteen days passed, the District put in writing its
proposal to eliminate the teachers' pay raises and notified the MEA that it
was moving forward with the impasse procedure, pursuant to the terms of the
statute.328 MEA continued to oppose the District's actions and refused to
attend the special magistrate hearing.329 On July 1, 2008, the special magi-
strate recommended that the District's proposal be accepted. 330 But the Dis-
trict rejected the special magistrate's decision, citing that it wanted to give
MEA one more chance to make its argument before the legislative body at
the impasse hearing.33'
Meanwhile, MEA and the District began Interest Based Bargaining
(IBB) under the contract reopener clause, for issues other than the elimina-
332thtion of pay raises. Before the process began, the District made clear the
fact that negotiations under the reopener were separate and did not replace
the necessary bargaining under the Financial Urgency statute.333 Nonethe
less, during IBB negotiations, MEA ended up proposing a "quick fix" solu-
tion that would save the District the necessary amount of money without
havig to ~ py rases 334having to eliminate pay raises. The District then petitioned the superinten-
dent to delay the financial urgency impasse so that it could have a chance to
present its solution to its member-employees for ratification in a contract.335
324. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R 146, at 92.
325. Id.; see generally FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010). The District also notified the Amer-
ican Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)-a union representing
other school board employees-of the declared financial urgency. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35
F.P.E.R. 46, at 92. The AFSCME immediately agreed to negotiations, which led to an
agreement with the District within the fourteen-day period. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 93.
329. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 46, at 93.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 93-94.
332. Id. at 94.
333. Id.
334. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 46, at 94.
335. Id.
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By this point, however, the District felt it was too risky to wait for rati-
fication of the "quick fix" provisions because if the MEA members failed to
ratify that contract, it would be too late for the District to impose the changes
before the start of the school year. 36 The District continued with the impasse
hearing in which it adopted its own proposals.337 However, the District
agreed that it would nullify the agreement adopted at impasse and consider
MEA's solution if submitted in a timely manner and in a ratified contract.338
On August 7, 2008, MEA filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the District and refused to continue the IBB negotiations. 339 MEA's charge
included several allegations.34 Most notably, though, MEA asserted that the
District improperly invoked the Financial Urgency statute by failing to meet
the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in Chiles; it should
have demonstrated a compelling state interest with no viable alternatives to
abrogating the contract before demanding to bargain under section
447.4095. 34' In his recommended order, the hearing officer found that the
District did not commit an unfair labor practice.342 Both parties filed timely
exceptions to PERC.343
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 46 at 86, 94. The charge was based on FLA.
STAT. § 447.501(a) (2008) and FLA. STAT. § 447.501(c) (2008). "Interfering with, restraining,
or coercing public employees in the exercise of any rights guaranteed them under this part."
FLA. STAT. § 447.501(a) (2010). "Refusing to bargain collectively, failing to bargain collec-
tively in good faith, or refusing to sign a final agreement agreed upon with the certified bar-
gaining agent for the public employees in the bargaining unit." Id. § 447.501(c).
340. See generally Charge Against Employer, Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. ' 46
(2009).
341. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 46, at 89.
342. Id. at 87. Hearing Officer Ruby found that the MEA had waived its right to bargain
over changes to the salary by failing to engage in bargaining once the District notified it of its
proposed change. Id. at 96 (recommendation of Ruby, Hearing Officer).
343. Id. at 87.
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2. PERC's Holding
PERC's decision hinged on whether the District properly invoked and
employed the Financial Urgency Statute.? In its unusually short analysis,
the majority of the commission opined that the District's actions complied
with its interpretation of the statute. 345 Based on its express language, PERC
found that the statute functioned simply to "provide public employers and
bargaining agents an opportunity to engage in abbreviated impact bargaining
when faced with a financial urgency requiring modification of an agree-
ment." 346 Here, the District notified MEA that it was declaring a financial
urgency under section 447.4095 and MEA thereafter was required to engage
in negotiations over the impact of the District's financial urgency. 347 The
District then, after fourteen days, was entitled to declare an impasse and
modify the collective bargaining agreement based on the impasse resolu-
tion.348 In concluding, PERC struck down MEA's argument that there were
prerequisites to acting under the statute.349 Instead, it decided that a public
employer was not required to demonstrate a compelling state interest or the
absence of viable alternatives before proceeding under the statute to the four-
teen-day negotiation period.35°
344. Id. at 89-90.
345. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. T 46, at 89.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 87, 89.
349. Id. at 89.
350. See Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 1 46, at 89.
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3. Analysis
PERC's reasoning in Manatee Education Ass'n was a clear deviation
from its past decisions, in which it heavily scrutinized employers' abilities to
unilaterally change mandatory subjects of bargaining. 351 Most notably,
PERC failed to apply its usual strict interpretation to a statute that has the
potential to abridge public employees' rights to collectively bargain or to
contract.352 For instance, in Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n I, PERC
explicitly found the Underfunding Statute to be an abrogation of a public
employee's constitutional right to collectively bargain, because it allowed the
employer to bypass the statutory collective bargaining process and instead
unilaterally change a mandatory subject of bargaining. 3 The Financial Ur-
gency Statute functions in the same way in that it, too, allows an employer to
avoid its obligation to collectively bargain over a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.3M But PERC obviously disregarded that discussion and, in fact,
failed to mention the rights of public employees even once in its opinion.355
And, if that decision was not strange enough, the commission in closing de-
clared that the Financial Urgency Statute functioned to "promote harmonious
and cooperative relationships between public employers and their em-
ployees"-a remark that, arguably, misses the point completely.356
351. See, e.g., Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n I, 18 F.P.E.R. 1 23069, at 122-23
(1992), rev'd, 614 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Martin Cnty. I, 18 F.P.E.R. 1
23061, at 100 (1992), rev'd, 613 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam); Tar-
pon Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 3140, 19 F.P.E.R. 1 24013, at 48 (1992); Pensacola
Junior Coll. Faculty Ass'n, 13 F.P.E.R. 18150, at 369 (1987); Holmes Cnty. Teachers'
Ass'n, 9 F.P.E.R. 1 14207, at 401-02 (1983).
352. See, e.g., Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 1 23069, at 123; Martin
Cnty. 1, 18 F.P.E.R. 23061, at 100.
353. Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n , 18 F.P.E.R. 1 23069, at 123.
354. See generally FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010).
355. See Sarasota Classified-TeachersAss'n I, 18 F.P.E.R. 9123069, at 123.
356. Manatee Educ. Ass'n, 35 F.P.E.R. 1 46, at 89 (2009) (citing FLA. STAT. § 447.201
(2010)).
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Amidst the vagueness of PERC's interpretation of the Financial Urgen-
cy Statute was its disapproval for MEA's contention that the Chiles test
should apply to situations in which a public employer seeks to justify its ab-
ridgment of a fundamental right under the statute.35 ' According to PERC, an
employer acting under section 447.4095 is not required to show a compelling
state interest, or prove a lack of viable alternatives to breaking the con-
tract.358 The commission reasoned that since the Chiles decision pre-dated
the execution of section 447.4095, the Florida Legislature must have known
of and considered the Chiles principles when it created the statute. 359 And
since the commission's interpretation of the statute revealed no sign of
Chiles, the legislature must have purposely left out the Court's holding.36°
But that simply cannot be the case.
D. The Constitutional Interpretation: Reconciling Financial Urgency with
Chiles
1. The Problem
If a public employer were allowed to proceed under the Financial Ur-
gency Statute, as it was interpreted by PERC in Manatee Education Ass'n, an
employer would be permitted to abridge a binding contract and undermine
employees' rights to collectively bargain under article I, section 6, simply by
declaring that a "financial urgency" existed and then engaging in abbreviated
impact bargaining. However, the Supreme Court of Florida has already ruled
that a public entity can abridge those rights only in cases where it can dem-
onstrate a compelling state interest and no viable alternatives to breaking the
contract.361 Any interpretation of section 447.4095 that removes it from the
command of Chiles would create two different standards for state and local
governments. It would render the statute unconstitutional.362 Therefore, the
statute would be unenforceable-a result that the legislature certainly did not
intend.
357. Id.
358. See id.
359. Id.
360. See id.
361. Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993); see also State v.
J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2004). The Court's holding in J.P. lent significant support to
its holding in Chiles, finding:
When a statute or ordinance operates to... impair[] the exercise of a fundamental right, then
the law must pass strict scrutiny.... It is settled law that each of the personal liberties enume-
rated in the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution is a fundamental right.. .. To
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Fortunately for the legislature, the law in Florida relating to statutory
interpretation supports a reading of section 447.4095 that rectifies it with the
Chiles holding. 63 Florida looks to the plain meaning of a statute, "unless
this leads to an unreasonable result or a result contrary to legislative in-
tent.''364 The long standing rule is that courts should always construe a sta-
tute as constitutional, when possible.365 A statute should not be interpreted
on its face alone, but in the context of its history and purpose, and in a way
that makes the law meaningful.366
2. The Context
As noted earlier, the legislature pondered at least two potential bills to
facilitate those changes. 367  Even though it passed only Senate Bill 888,
House Bill 1267, too, had been subject to analysis by legislative commit-
tees.368 But it was the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Florida PBA
that first prompted the legislature to create those bills, 369 and the language
from its staff analyses aids in understanding the legislature's intention for the
financial urgency statute.37°
First, the staff analysis for Senate Bill 888 makes a direct reference to
its reconciliation with the Court's holding in Florida PBA, which evidences
withstand strict scrutiny, a law must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1109-10 (citations omitted).
362. See J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1108-10.
363. Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 713 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Daniels v. Fla.
Dep't of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64-65 (Fla. 2005)).
364. Id.
365. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 207 (Fla. 2007).
366. Matrix Emp. Leasing v. Hernandez, 975 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
This court must interpret statutes by the well-established norms of statutory construction which
require rendering the statutory provision meaningful. To properly determine the scope of a
statutory term, it is necessary to consider the act as a whole, the evil to be corrected, the lan-
guage of the act, including its title, the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already
in existence on the subject.
Id. (citation omitted).
367. See Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, § 1-3, 1995 Fla. Laws 1943-44 (codified
as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.309(2)(a)-(b), .4095 (1995)); see also FLA. LEGIs., FINAL
LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 288,
CS for HB 1267.
368. See Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 1.
369. See State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla. PBA), 613 So. 2d 415, 420 n.8 (Fla.
1992).
370. See Govtl. Ops. Comm. SB 888 Staff Analysis, supra note 276, at 2.
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371that the legislature created the Bill at least partly in response to that case.
But the legislature incorporated more principles from that case than just the
holding-it also included the Court's reasoning that the parties should re-
negotiate the contract provisions at issue instead of allowing the legislature
to unilaterally change them.372 The Court noted in a footnote that:
While such a solution would certainly be preferable to unilateral
changes, we refuse to impose renegotiation on our own preroga-
tive. Although some courts have ordered renewed negotiations af-
ter a legislature fails to fund a provision, this remedy has only been
imposed where the legislature itself mandated it. Accordingly,
such a solution would be completely without precedent as a judi-
cially-imposed remedy, in addition to being administratively un-
tenable. 373
In that sense, the Florida PBA opinion acts as the foundation of the Fi-
nancial Urgency Statute. And, since that case and Chiles go hand-in-hand to
provide precedent for public agencies' conflicts between fiscal emergencies
and collective bargaining obligations, it is essentially the law from each of
those cases that underlies the functioning of that statute.374
Besides that case law, the staff analysis of Bill 1267 is particularly help-
ful. 375 In the staff analysis, the House Governmental Operations Committee
addressed the impact of Bill 1267 on government costs: "If local govern-
ments underfund an existing contract then some costs will be incurred to
provide evidence regarding financial urgency and negotiate the impact of the
371. Id. ("The effect of this change is to provide that it is not an unfair labor practice for
the [s]tate [l]egislature to fail to appropriate funds sufficient to meet its contractual obligations
in the bargaining agreement. This change would be consistent with . . .[the Florida PBA
case].") (internal citations omitted); see also Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis,
supra note 275, at 3-4 (noting that per the Florida PBA case the Florida Legislature, in con-
trast to local governments, has the authority "to determine the level of funding for a collective
bargaining agreement"). The House Committee analyzing Bill 1267 explained well how the
proposed amendment would affect local governments:
This bill amends [the Underfunding Statute] to effectively repeal, as to local legislative bodies
the requirement that if insufficient funds are appropriated to fund a collective bargaining
agreement, then the agreement must be administered on the basis of the amount appropriated,
and the protection provided that failure to fully fund a collective bargaining agreement shall
not constitute an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, if this bill passes, local legislative bodies
that fail to fully fund a collective bargaining agreement will be subject to charges of unfair la-
bor practice.
HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 3.
372. Id. at 4 (citing Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 418-19).
373. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 420 n.8 (citations omitted).
374. See generally id.; Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
375. See generally Govtl Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275.
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financial urgency or defend any unfair labor practice complaint filed by the
employees with [PERC]. '376 This description provides two major impres-
sions of legislative intent to make the financial urgency statute compliant
with the law from Florida PBA and Chiles.
377
First, the committee's language suggests that at least one purpose of the
statute is to provide local governments an alternative to the Underfunding
Statute in which they can underfund collective bargaining contracts in cases
of "financial urgency"-but only after providing evidence of a financial ur-
gency.378 The requirement of that showing is not applied to the state gov-
ernment pursuant to the Underfunding Statute; the legislature imposed it only
on local governments based on the fact that those governments cannot de-
pend on alternate sources of constitutional power with which to justify unila-
teral changes to collective bargaining contracts.379 Instead, it is the required
proof of a financial urgency that justifies their unilateral changes to collec-
tive bargaining contracts-unlike the state legislature, which can justify its
action pursuant to its power to appropriate public funds. 380 Thus, since a
local government, acting under this statute, is not acting pursuant to a consti-
tutional power, and will be attempting to abrogate one or more fundamental
rights of its employees, it must abide by the guidelines set forth in Chiles.38'
Second, the legislature did not condition the showing of the proof of a
382eiddfinancial urgency on any affirmative acts by the union. For example, it did
not specify that "some costs will be incurred [to the employer] to provide
evidence regarding financial urgency" in response to an unfair labor prac-
tice.383 Instead, the legislature's inclusion that a public employer show proof
of a financial urgency independent of any conditions implies that a public
employer must make that showing in any circumstance in which it seeks to
act under the Financial Urgency Statute, and not only when mandated to do
so by a hearing officer or judicial body.384 The static nature of that require-
ment strengthens the idea that the showing of proof is the justification
through which a local government can underfund or unilaterally change a
376. Id. at I (emphasis added).
377. See generally Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275; Chiles,
615 So. 2d 671; Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d. 415.
378. Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 1-2.
379. See Govti. Ops. Comm. SB 888 Staff Analysis, supra note 276, at 1-2.
380. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 419-20.
381. See generally Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 671.
382. See Govtl. Ops. Comm. HB 1267 Staff Analysis, supra note 275, at 1.
383. Id.
384. See id.
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collective bargaining contract-similar to the state's justification to do the
same through its appropriations power.385
Reading the Chiles and Florida PBA cases along with the legislative
history of Bills 888 and 1267 illustrates that the legislature created the Fi-
nancial Urgency Statute to provide local governments a statutory means to
deal with financial emergencies in the face of collective bargaining obliga-
tions, but that would not protect them from unfair labor practice charges if
their actions do not comply with Florida law.386 It is local government's
substitute for the Underfunding Statute and should be interpreted and applied
pursuant to the same standards.387
3. The Language of Section 447.4095
Because a public employer acting under section 447.4095 of the Florida
Statutes has the potential to impair two fundamental rights enjoyed by public
employees, the statute must be given a strict construction. 388 The statute can
be split in two parts for easier analysis: the first phrase in part one, "[i]n the
event of a financial urgency requiring modification of an agreement," and the
remainder of the statute, which governs the impact bargaining procedure.389
This section will analyze the statutory language step-by-step, beginning with
part two and then moving along to part one.
a. First, Part Two
Underlying the Chiles test is the idea that once a government entity has
agreed to and funded a collective bargaining agreement, it cannot then
change its mind and breach the contract it created absent a sufficient rea-
son. 390 That sufficient reason, the Court held, is a compelling state interest
with no viable alternatives. 39' However, the Financial Urgency Statute man-
dates only that the parties bargain the impact of the financial urgency even
though that topic would be considered a mandatory subject of bargaining
under Florida law, which requires collective bargaining.392 In the context of
385. See id. at 3.
386. See generally Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 671; State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla.
PBA), 613 So. 2d. 415 (Fla. 1992).
387. See generally Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 95-218, §§ 1-2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1943,
1943-44 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.309(2)(a)-(b), .4095 (1995)).
388. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1109 (Fla. 2004).
389. See FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010).
390. See Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 673.
391. Id.
392. See FLA. STAT. § 447.309(1).
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the Financial Urgency Statute, impact bargaining essentially allows public
employers to unilaterally implement their changes after the fourteen-day
session-a statutorily set "reasonable" period-of negotiating with their em-
ployees over only the impact of the changes. 93 And after the fourteen-day
"reasonable" period, the employer can unilaterally enact its changes without
proceeding to impasse.394
One additional consequence of the requirement to impact bargain under
the statute instead of collective bargain pertains to time limits. 395 Under sec-
tion 447.309 of the Florida Statutes, there is no time imposition on the par-
ties to reach an agreement over a mandatory subject of bargaining.396 But in
the case of the Financial Urgency Statute, the parties are required to reach an
agreement within fourteen days over an otherwise mandatory subject of bar-
gaining in order to prevent the employer's unilateral action.397
It is true that under the Florida PBA case, the court contemplated a situ-
ation in which parties to a collective bargaining agreement could renegotiate
one of its provisions in lieu of the employer's unilateral change to it.398 But
that reasoning was based on the parties return to the table to collectively bar-
gain changes to mandatory subjects.399 However, this deprives public em-
393. See City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Supervisor's Ass'n, 791 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In Jacksonville Supervisor's Ass'n, the court notes that impact bar-
gaining requires the employer to give "notice and a reasonable opportunity to bargain [with
the bargaining agent] before implementing its decision,' but... 'does not require the employ-
er to submit to an impasse in negotiations... prior to implementation"' as collective bargain-
ing does. Id. at 510 (quoting Jacksonville Supervisor's Ass'n, 26 F.P.E.R. 31140 at 246,
255 (2000) affd and rev'd in part by 791 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001)). The court
makes the distinction that impact bargaining is triggered only in cases that involve managerial
rights and not for mandatory subjects of bargaining that require collective bargaining under
section 447.309(1). Id. at 511.
394. See generally City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Supervisor's Ass'n, 791 So. 2d 508
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
395. See FLA. STAT. § 447.309(5) (2010).
396. See §§ 447.309(1), .403(1). Parties are required to negotiate only for a "reasonable"
period of time, with the "reasonable" standard to be determined by the parties and not by
statute, before proceeding through the impasse procedure to resolve the dispute. Id. §
447.403(1).
397. See id. § 447.4095.
398. State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla. PBA), 613 So. 2d 415, 420 n.8 (Fla.
1992).
399. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 420 n.8. The Court in Florida PBA offered that reasoning
based on the renegotiation of annual leave times, which is a mandatory subject of bargaining
under Florida law. Id.; St. Petersburg Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 747, 5 F.P.E.R. 10381,
at 392 (1979) (finding that a public employer's vacation leave policies are required subjects of
bargaining). Moreover, the Court based its reasoning on cases from two other jurisdictions,
both of which supported the mandate for the parties to collectively bargain over the mandato-
ry subjects in dispute. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 420 n.8.
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ployees the right to collectively bargain under article I, section 6 of the Flori-
da Constitution.40 It also acts to abridge their rights to contract under article
I, section 10, since impact bargaining allows the public employer to imple-
ment its changes after bargaining for a "reasonable" period.401
The sham bargaining process enumerated in the statute does not replace
the Chiles standard.402 Only the collective bargaining process assures public
employees the right to effective negotiations under article I, section 6.4o3 At
the most, the impact bargaining merely supplements the Chiles procedures,
perhaps reasoning that some negotiating was better than none at all.
404
b. Next, Part One
First, we know some things from the language used in the statute. We
know that the term "modification" means to alter or change. We also know
that the phrase "an agreement," in its strictest sense, could refer to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that has not yet been funded, one that has been
funded, or both. 4o5 In Chiles, the Court held that a negotiated agreement
does not become a binding contract until the legislature has accepted and
funded it.4°6 But that decision was premised on the Court's holding in Flori-
da PBA that collective bargaining agreements on the state level are inherent-
ly limited by and thus always subject to the legislature's appropriations pow-
er.407 But the legislature, by amending the Underfunding Statute to apply
only to states, has put an end to the question of whether the separation of
powers argument restricts a local government's ability to collectively bargain
with their employees.
40 8
400. Fla. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 416.
401. See id. at 416-19.
402. See Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993).
403. See id.
404. Compare id. with FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010).
405. FLA. STAT. § 447.4095. In chapter 447 of the Florida Statutes, the legislature uses the
terms "collective bargaining agreement" and "agreement" interchangeably to depict both
funded and unfunded negotiated agreements. See § 447.309(1). Compare § 447.309(2)(a)
("Upon execution of the collective bargaining agreement, the chief executive shall ... request
the legislative body to appropriate such amounts as shall be sufficient to fund the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement.") (emphasis added) and § 447.309(4) ("If the agreement
is not ratified by the public employer... [it] shall be returned to the chief executive officer
and the employee organization for further negotiations.") (emphasis added), with § 447.401
("[A]n arbiter... shall not have the power to add to, subtract from, modify, or alter the terms
of a[n] [existing] collective bargaining agreement.") (emphasis added).
406. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 672-73.
407. Id.
408. See FLA. STAT. § 447.4095(2010).
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The alternative, and more suitable, option regarding the time a nego-
tiated agreement becomes a binding contract at the local level has been de-
clared by PERC, pursuant to section 447.309(1), to be the time when an
agreement's terms are approved by the parties, reduced to writing, and then
ratified by the bargaining unit members and the public employer. 409 This
timing can also be inferred from section 447.403(4)(e), which states that if
the bargaining unit fails to ratify an agreement reached by way of impasse,
then that agreement never reaches the status of a contract--even though it
has been funded. 410 This is the better position. In that context, a public em-
ployer may invoke the Financial Urgency Statute when it seeks to modify a
collective bargaining agreement that has been ratified by both parties and
thus made a binding contract, whether or not funded.4 '
Applying a strict interpretation to the statute contemplates the term "an
agreement" to relate to a contract that is presently in force.412 But the clear
language of the statute fails to address whether the public employer can de-
pend on it during the status quo period.413 While the status quo period is
technically not regulated by the terms of an existing contract, the terms of the
old contract remain "alive in spite of its expiration date" and regulate the
parties until a new agreement is ratified.41 4 Interpreting the language of the
statute to include the status quo period may seem like a stretch, but that dis-
tance is made up for with legislative intent.
415
In the absence of the Underfunding Statute, the legislature sought to
provide public employers with an alternate means of relief for their fiscal
416
emergencies. Public employers are not immune from those emergencies
during the status quo period.417 In fact, employers arguably are even more
vulnerable during that period because the terms of the old contract require
funding not provided for in the new budget.418 Consequently, it would be
illogical to conclude that the Legislature meant to restrict use of the statute to
409. Volusia Cnty. Pub. Emps. Ass'n, 9 F.P.E.R. 14187, at 356 (1983).
410. See FLA. STAT. § 447.403(4)(e) ( "If [the] agreement is not ratified by all parties ...
the legislative body's action shall not take effect with respect to those disputed impasse issues
[that] establish the language of contractual provisions [that] could have no effect in the ab-
sence of a ratified agreement, including, but not limited to, preambles, recognition clauses,
and duration clauses.").
411. See id.
412. See Sarasota Classified-Teachers Ass'n II, 614 So. 2d 1143, 1147 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
413. See id.
414. Id.
415. See id.
416. Id. at 1149.
417. See Sarasota Classified- Teachers Ass'n H, 614 So. 2d at 1148.
418. See id.
2010]
51
Rosinski: Labor Relations in Florida's Public Sector: Visiting the State's
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAW REVIEW
only the life of the contract, but instead intended to provide relief to employ-
ers during any time in which they are struggling to balance finances with
bargaining obligations. 419 Thus, "an agreement" applies to both the time
under an existing contract and the time during the status quo period.420
Moving on to the term "require." There are three definitions for that
word: 1) "to claim or ask for by right and authority;",42' 2) "to call for as
suitable or appropriate; ' '42 2 and 3) "to demand as necessary or essential: have
a compelling need for., 423 Since the Financial Urgency statute is provided
for times of financial emergency, the most suitable definition would be the
third.424 Before invoking the statute, the employer should have a compelling,
essential, or necessary need to modify an agreement.425 This term naturally
goes along with the "financial urgency" phrase.426 For example, an employer
may have a financial urgency, but if there are viable alternatives available
that could defray its breaking of the contract, then the employer is not re-
quired to modify an agreement-his need is not compelling, essential, or
necessary.427 On the other hand, the employer may have a compelling, es-
sential, or necessary need to modify an agreement, but if it cannot prove the
428
existence of a "financial urgency," it will not qualify to use the statute.
Therefore, the term "require" as used in the statute implies that the employer
will only have a compelling, essential, or necessary need to modify an
agreement if it can prove there is no viable alternative to its action.429
This brings us to the last term, "financial urgency., 430 The legislature
left this term "to practice" for interpretation. 431 A financial urgency could
mean a situation in which an employer cannot afford to fund both the labor
contract and an essential service or function of its enterprise. 2 For example,
if a sheriff's office is faced with the decision to either eliminate pay raises or
layoff several hundred of its public safety employees, or if the school board
is forced to either close down several schools or cut teachers' pay, could
419. See id. at 1149.
420. See id.
421. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1058 (1 th ed. 2008).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. See FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010).
425. Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993).
426. See id. at 672.
427. See id. at 673.
428. See id.
429. See id.
430. FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010).
431. Govtl. Ops. Comm. SB 888 Staff Analysis, supra note 276, at 3.
432. Id.
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constitute financial urgency.433 In either instance, the employer's dire finan-
cial situation puts the public interest at risk. A public employer's inability to
comply with a statute could give rise to a financial urgency, such as where a
school board is required to maintain a certain balance in reserve or the re-
quirement of a balanced budget. This term, however, is something to be left
to the courts to decide-perhaps even on a case-by-case basis.
VI. CONCLUSION
In whole, a financial urgency requiring modification of an agreement
contemplates a situation in which the employer has a compelling state inter-
est. It is in an emergency situation with no viable alternative to act under the
statute. The employer faces such dire financial conditions that it has no
choice but to underfund the labor contract or else risk a much more adverse
result. That interpretation complies with legislative intent, Chiles and the
Constitution.434
Interpreting the statute in a way that makes it enforceable is beneficial
to both public employers and public employees. With any other interpreta-
tion, the statute may be thrown out, leaving public employees no statutory
relief from labor contract obligations in times of financial emergency. Public
employees will have their constitutional rights kept safe, a promise-at the
very least-to which they are entitled after the drawn out and frustrating
process they endured to achieve them.
The respected arbitrator Roger L. Abrams said it best in one of his opi-
nions:
The term "to bargain collectively" has a well understood
meaning. It means to give-and-take across the negotiation table,
reach agreement-if you can, and then keep your promises. To
read [the Financial Urgency Statute] to allow the public employer
to escape from its promises in the absence of the most compelling
circumstances would make a mockery of collective bargaining. As
Lewis Carroll wrote in Alice in Wonderland: "Everything's got a
moral, if you can only find it." Here, the moral is: "When you
make a deal, you live by it."4 35
433. Sarasota Classified Teachers Ass'n II, 614 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993); State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Fla. PBA), 613 So. 2d 415, 416 (Fla. 1992).
434. See FLA. CONST. art. I § 6; FLA. STAT. § 447.4095 (2010); Chiles v. United Faculty of
Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993).
435. Palm Beach Cnty. Police Benevolent Ass'n (Palm Beach Cnty. PBA) 101 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 78, 88 (1993) (Abrams, Arb.).
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